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In order to evaluate the Soviet officer's actions in
war properly, it is not only necessary to know his order of
battle and capabilities but also to have some understanding
of his preconceptions and values in the thought and
decision-making processes and to evaluate his actions from
that perspective. To project American values into Soviet
military thought is unacceptable due to the conflicting
ideological bases of the Soviet and American cultures.
Proper interpretation of Soviet military thought must
include an understanding of its foundation in the Marxist-
Leninist ideology and the Soviet/Russian culture, as well as
of its concepts such as military doctrine, science, and art.
All of these are radically different from their U.S.
counterparts. This thesis is written as a primer for U.S.
military officers, all of whom require a fundamental
understanding of the Soviet perspective.
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PREFACE
The purpose of this thesis is to provide the U.S.
military officer with a basic understanding of Soviet
military thought and its differences from U.S. military
thought. It does not attempt to present any new hypotheses
or analyses of Soviet military affairs. Nor does it presume
to be an all-encompassing study of the Soviet Armed Forces.
It should be used primarily as an introduction for the
officer who does not have a sound knowledge of Soviet
perceptions of military affairs and war. The author's
motivation in preparing this thesis was his own lack of
understanding as a line officer whose formal education on
the Soviet Armed Forces (before attending the Naval
Postgraduate School) had been exclusively in hardware
capabilities and weapons parameters. There is little
knowledge among U.S. officers of how the Soviets think and
prepare for war.
The sources used in this study were purposely limited to
open literature so that the reader might conduct further
research on the topic. Hopefully the information presented
here and the sources in the List of References and
Bibliography will aid in the professional development of
those readers interested in expanding their knowledge of
Soviet military thought.
I. INTRODUCTION: KNOW THE ENEMY
Know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles
you will never be in peril. ... If ignorant both of your
enemy and of yourself, you are certain in every battle to
be in peril.
Sun Tzu, The Art of War
Sun Tzu's advice has not always been properly applied in
the United States, where "knowing the enemy" has become a
quantitative analysis of hardware capabilities, a "bean
count" of ours and theirs which offers little explanation
for the enemy's intentions. Such a view is incomplete in
the field of threat analysis (or net assessment), which must
include an understanding of the enemy's ideology, culture,
and language. These are the factors which affect the
thought and decision-making processes and thus determine how
the enemy will use his hardware.
There is undoubtedly controversy over why it is
important to know anything more about the enemy than his
physical combat capabilities and one's own ability to
counter them. In the U.S. this requirement is necessitated
by radical differences between American military thoucht and
that of its primary adversary, the Soviet Union.
In order to evaluate the Soviet officer's thoughts and
actions, it is not only necessary to know his order of
battle and capabilities but also to have some understanding
of his preconceptions and values in the thought and
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decision-making processes and to evaluate his actions from
that perspective. To project Western values into Soviet
military thought is unacceptable due to the conflicting
ideological bases of the Soviet and American cultures.
A. "PERCEIVING" THE ENEMY
In this context, "threat perception" must be studied as
a component of threat analysis. It is perception which
determines who the enemy is, the extent of his capabilities,
and how he will use them. Most importantly, perceptions are
not universal but are learned through values and channels
of influence which vary greatly between societies. These
differing values ultimately determine a nation's military
objectives and thus form the basis for development of the
armed forces.
In the United States, perhaps the fundamental problem of
threat perception is an unwillingness of the nation to even
recognize that an enemy exists. The task of getting the
"national interest" to recognize a threat is not easily
accomplished in this democratic, increasingly
individualistic, geographically isolated society. Even the
leadership often assumes an attitude that the USSR has
become less antagonistic and truly wants to maintain an
American notion of "peaceful coexistence." The Soviets,
however, make it no secret that they are indeed the undying
enemy of the Capitalist states.
Even when Americans recognize an enemy they do not
always understand the context of his language. Soviet
literature is riddled with key-words and phrases of very
precise definition and contextual application. When an
English language equivalent exists (which is not always the
case), the definition can be easily misunderstood. English
terms such as "peaceful coexistence," "detente," and even
"strategy" and "tactics" have quite different meanings from
their Russian language counterparts.
Proper U.S. interpretation of this language of Soviet
military thought must be accompanied by an understanding of
its foundation in the Marxist-Leninist ideology and the
Soviet/Russian culture. With this critical basis of
knowledge one can begin to predict Soviet thoughts and
actions on the field of battle.
B. WHO SHOULD "PERCEIVE"?
There is of course debate over who should be concerned
with capabilities and intentions. In the U.S., capabilities
are traditionally a military concern while political leaders
deal with intentions [Ref. 1: p. 65], Such a division of
labor in threat analysis cannot, however, eliminate the
necessity for the military commander to interpret the
Soviets' intentions and resulting actions when encountered
in both peacetime and battle.
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To understand the enemy from his own perspective
requires constant education which must begin with junior
officers and continue throughout a military career. This is
not to suggest that all officers should be political-
military subspecialists, but that all officers must have at
least a fundamental understanding of those factors which
influence the enemy's thoughts and decisions. This
understanding is particularly important when encountering
Soviet military thought because it enables an officer to
more quickly perceive what the Soviets are up to if he has
a reasonable appreciation of the strategy underlying their
tactics. Without this appreciation, he may make the
critical mistake many officers make in mirror-imaging
their own operational and tactical leadership views onto
their Soviet counterparts. A junior officer with an
appreciation of strategic thought will understand the
importance of including in his thoughts the cultures of
the two countries. [Ref. 2: p. 133]
Thus, this thesis is written for the U.S. military officer
who requires an understanding of the Soviet perspective.
Many of the concepts included here are in themselves entire
academic disciplines in the Soviet Union. The volume of
literature available on Soviet military thought is
inexhaustible and constantly growing. Hopefully this study
will serve as a primer for pursuing the endless task of
"Understanding the Soviet Threat."
C. ORGANIZATION
In pursuing this understanding it will first be
necessary to define and explain the origin and basic tenets
11
of that entity which affects all aspects of Soviet life and
thought: Marxism-Leninism. Second, the influence of the
Russian "national character" will be combined with that of
the ideology in a presentation of Soviet and American
mentalities and the Soviet military experience. The effect
of these influences on the Soviet officer will then be
reviewed in the context of Soviet political-military
indoctrination, training and education, and styles of
leadership and initiative.
This understanding of the Soviet officer's thoughts,
decisions, and actions will enable the reader better to
assume a Soviet perspective in studying the differences
between such Soviet and U.S. concepts as military doctrine,
military science, and military art (and its components of
strategy, operational art, and tactics). This will be
followed by a similar review of Soviet and U.S. concepts of
war. The importance of avoiding value-projection and
cultural biases will be integral to this discussion which
will include an application of the current policies of
glasnost [openness] and perestroyka [restructuring] and the
effect they are likely to have on the Soviet military.
The conclusion will address briefly the resemblance
between the military structure and the ideology, the
combined arms concept of the Soviet Armed Forces, and will
include a prescription for study of the Soviet perspective.
12
II. MARXIST-LENINIST FOUNDATION
The decisive element in the training of officer
personnel is their ideological hardening, arming them with
Marxist-Leninist theory. Only on the basis of materialist
dialectics and a profound understanding of the laws of
social development, can officer personnel correctly
understand the objective laws of modern wars, their
political and technical character and features, master all
the forms and means of armed combat, and advance the cause
of Soviet military science.
V. M. Domnikov, The Officer's Handbook
This statement might seem puzzling to a U.S. officer, as
it equates to telling him that intensive training on the
Declaration of Independence and the democratic tradition
which it preserves are his decisive prerequisites for going
into combat. Because equating combat effectiveness with a
knowledge of ideology is an unusual proposition from an
American perspective, the obvious reaction is to assume that
such statements are simply patriotic rhetoric which are
accepted but not always believed or applied in one's daily
routine. A more accurate observation is that while every
Soviet officer is not a professor of Marxism-Leninism, he
cannot be unaffected by its constant presence. Its role is
similar to religious upbringing in the U.S., that of "a
powerful force that must be dealt with even if the adult no
longer practices the faith. In both religion and ideology,
certain truths are accepted as articles of faith."
[Ref. 3: p. 41]
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In the Soviet Union, Marxist-Leninist indoctrination
begins in grammar school and remains omnipresent throughout
life. The ideology provides the justification for
rationalizing every decision and policy of the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). Lenin's Complete
Collected Works include over 50 volumes which can be quoted
in whatever context is necessary. Even if a citizen (or
service member) is apathetic towards the never-ending slogans
and propaganda, he cannot publicly speak out against them.
More relevant is the necessity of the military to reflect
the ideology and support the CPSU. As the "keeper" of
Marxism-Leninism, the CPSU has a vested interest in ensuring
that its teachings are very prevalent in the Soviet
military, which secures the Party's power [Ref. 4: p. 3 2].
Proceeding from this position that the Soviet military
officer is indeed profoundly influenced by Marxist-Leninist
concepts, it becomes necessary to understand what these
influences are. It will soon be evident that Marxism-
Leninism is not rhetoric, but the foundation for military
doctrine and science. It is, from a Soviet perspective,
" the scientific methodology, which gives Soviet military
science its preeminent place in the world and its assurance
of superiority over Western military theory."
[Ref. 5: p. ii]
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A. DEFINITION OF MARXISM-LENINISM
There is no equivalent in the United States to this
"scientific" view of the world which is defined as
the science of the cognition and revolutionary
transformation of the world: of the laws governing the
development of society, nature and human thought; of the
laws of the revolutionary struggle of the working class
and of the methods of overthrowing capitalism and building
the new socialist society. [Ref. 6: p. 33]
A review of Marxist-Leninist ideology is never pleasant for
an American because its concepts are completely foreign to
his own thought process. Consequently, most Americans would
write off the above definition as meaningless Communist
propaganda. Such a dismissal would be a grave error because
the phrases and key words in this definition have very
precise meanings which explain the tenets of Marxism-
Leninism. This ideology is considered a science with
immutable laws rather than an ideological theory. It is
supreme to all other scientific theories and laws. For
example, the study of Einstein's theory of relativity was
forbidden until forty years ago because it allegedly
contradicted Marxism [Ref. 7: p. 27].
In the most fundamental terms, Marxism-Leninism
considers the world and all its elements to be in constant
turmoil. History is seen as predetermined and leads to the
inevitable triumph of Communism, a "worker's paradise."
This paradise is the better world of an atheistic ideology
which does not believe in the hereafter. Capitalism (led by
15
the United States) is the only entity blocking the
i
i
•achievement of true Communism. Therefore, peace and the end
of the struggle will not come about until Capitalism has
been defeated. In fact, the Russian word mir , which
translates into English as peace , is actually "a higher
state of the world that cannot exist until capitalism has
been eliminated and worldwide communism has triumphed."
[Ref. 3: p. 40] The Soviets consider "everlasting peace
among nations, the elimination of wars and preparation for
them" to be the "international principle of communist
society and one of the great ideals for which communists
struggle." [Ref. 8: p. 624]
Of further importance in a fundamental understanding of
the ideology is its concept of the "class" nature of
warfare. In light of the above principle, the Soviets do
not view peace with the United States (a nation) as
impossible, only peace with the Capitalists (a class) and
their "bourgeois ideology." To this end, Communists give
themselves the right to conduct international relations with
other parties, organizations, and classes of peoples, to
"foment dissent," and "organize opposition to elected
governments." [Ref. 3: p. 40] Such relations are conducted
through the International Department of the CPSU's Central
Committee, which enables Party officials to
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meet with sympathetic political leaders, recruit local
government officials, conduct propaganda and
"disinformation" campaigns, and instruct local surrogates
on Soviet policies. [Ref. 9: p. 47]
This department is now headed by Anatoly Dobrynin, long time
Soviet Ambassador to the United States, indicating a
possible increased importance of U.S. affairs in such work.
Finally, Marxism-Leninism is in no hurry to defeat
Capitalism. Because history is predetermined, events will
eventually work in favor of the forces of Communism. The
leadership simply has the role of "guiding" history towards
the inevitable. In this context there can even be failure
and temporary compromise so long as they do not affect the
ultimate victory.
This introduction to Marxism-Leninism provides only a
superficial and still incomplete review of its beliefs. To
continue studying the ideology and its primary concept of
"dialectical materialism" (the meaning of which shall soon
be evident) requires a knowledge of its origin. Marxism-
Leninism was not developed entirely from the thoughts of
either Karl Marx or Vladimir Il'ich Lenin but paradoxically
has its roots in the same period as does the American
Democratic tradition: the eighteenth-century Age of
Enlightenment.
While a historical review of this period may at first
seem irrelevant to the U.S. officer's understanding of
Soviet military thought, the ideas of this period had a
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direct influence on present-day Marxism-Leninism. A
knowledge of these ideas will enable the reader to better
understand the military's foundation in, and practice of,
the ideology.
B. ORIGINS OF THE IDEOLOGY
1 . Democratic and Socialist Origins
The Age of Enlightenment was a period when European
philosophy and social thought was greatly influenced by the
emerging Industrial Revolution. All previously accepted
ideas and institutions were questioned on the basis of "pure
reason." [Ref. 10: p. 521] The Enlightenment brought forth
the origins of political and social democracy in the works
of philosophers such as John Locke (from seventeenth-century
England), Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Louis, Baron de
Montesquieu (both from eighteenth-century France). The
resulting "natural rights philosophy" and "humanitarianism"
of the period included the concept of the inalienable rights
of man to "life, liberty, property and the pursuit of
happiness. " The government became the instrument of the
state in securing and protecting these rights for the
citizens, who could revolt if the government failed in this
aim. [Ref. 4: p. 48]
In Germany, the foundation for Marxism-Leninism was
also being laid in the works of Immanuel Kant and George
Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, both e igh te e n th - c e n tur
y
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philosophers. Kant studied the "limitations of human
understanding and established the rationalism of pure
experience." [Ref. 10: p. 522] His philosophy was that of a
"humanistic idealism" which considered man to be
perfectible. Hegel improved on Kant's philosophy of
perfectibility and of "becoming," which stated that there
was a future state of man which could not be comprehended in
the present, but perhaps in the future. It was these two
concepts, along with those of "alienation" and the
"historical dialectic," which Marx borrowed from Hegel.
[Ref. 11: pp. 1-2] Before continuing with Marx's
interpretations of Hegel and Lenin's subsequent
interpretations of Marx, the Hegelian philosophy of the
historical dialectic, as it is practiced today in Marxist-
Leninist philosophy, must be reviewed. This concept, while
initially puzzling, is central to Marxism-Leninism and,
consequently, Soviet military thought. Examples of
practical military application of each law of the dialectic
will provide the U.S. officer with an understanding of the
crucial importance of this concept.
2. Laws of the Dialectic
Marxism-Leninism is based upon the three "laws of
materialist dialectics" which are: the law of the unity and
struggle of opposites, the law of the mutual conversion of
quantitative and qualitative changes, and the law of the
negation of the negation. Despite the seemingly vague
19
philosophical rhetoric of these concepts, they each have
important practical uses at every level of military
affairs, and are the vehicles by which the Soviets are
continuing their progression to true Communism.
The first law explains that opposing tendencies are
inherent within every entity and system, and that these
opposites are in constant conflict. For example, the
struggle between the conflicting Capitalist and Socialist
states is constant until the demise of the former.
Therefore, the Soviet view of "detente" is not an agreement
between friendly nations, but simply a relaxation of tension
in the ongoing struggle with Capitalism. It is in fact a
continuation of war without armed conflict.
This law is easily applied to military affairs by
understanding the conflict between opposing tendencies such
as surprise versus preparation, massing versus dispersal, or
offense versus defense. In dialectical terms, the
"development of new offensive weapons has always inevitably
led to the development of corresponding [defensive]
countermeasures, and ultimately to the development of new
modes of fighting . . . and war as a whole." [Ref. 12] This
explains the existence of anti-submarine warfare, anti-air
warfare, anti-tank warfare, etc.
The second law contends that the quantitative
accumulation of new factors eventually brings about
qualitative change. In this context, the development of new
20
modes of fighting mentioned above does not occur
"immediately upon the appearance of a new weapon, but only
when they begin to be employed in a quantity which
inevitably induces a new qualitative state of the
phenomenon." For example, in World War I there were not
enough tanks and aircraft to make a significant difference
in the war. Yet their mass production after the war
resulted in the development of "large tank and aviation
combined units and formations," resulting in the qualitative
change of military operations into the theory of "operations
in depth" during World War II. [Ref. 12]
The third law of the dialectic, the "negation of
the negation," is seen in terms of a thesis which is negated
in the struggle with its antithesis, from which a synthesis
evolves. This synthesis becomes the new thesis. Lenin saw
this as an ongoing process until the final synthesis of
Communism is reached through evolution from Capitalism (the
thesis) through Socialism (the antithesis).
Again applied to military affairs, one weapon,
combat system, or platform may be negated by another
although "positive elements" of the original are carried
over to the new and continue to improve. For example, naval
vessels have evolved from oar-power to sail-power, to steam-
power, to diesel and gas turbine power, and finally to
nuclear power. [Ref. 12]
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The previously mentioned concept of "alienation" is
a direct result of the historical dialectic, which Marx
later saw as dialectical materialism. Hegel believed that
history was the process by which a world spirit, the
Weltgeist , came to know itself and realize its eventual
perfection. Man was the agent through which this
realization occurred. Reality existed in the thoughts of
the Weltgeist as a thesis through which man's thoughts
materialized. Man then produced an object as the
antithesis, which at this stage is alienated from the
spirit. Through a synthesis, the spirit realizes the object
as its own creation and becomes more perfect. At this point
the cycle of "reality" continues. [Ref. 11: p. 2]
3. The Marxist Approach
Marx thought that Hegel's philosophy was
"mystified." Therefore, he borrowed Hegel's ideas and used
them in a context of "materialism." Marx and Friedrich
Engels (a ninteenth-century German Socialist) believed that
production gave rise to thought, rather than vice-versa. In
this context, man was considered a compulsive producer. It
was through this production that man realized his own
perfectibility and increased his self-knowledge. Thus, man
assumed the reality which Hegel had attributed to the
Weltgeist. [Ref. Ill pp. 2-3]
In Marxist philosophy, man is alienated from his
product, "the fruits of his labor," through class struggle.
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This began when slave owners took the laborers 1 products as
their own. Slavery and, subsequently, Feudalism and
Capitalism have become known as the "modes of production."
In each of these modes a privileged class has legitimized
itself as the owner of the "means of production," which Marx
believed should be common property. Communism is, of
course, the conclusion of this struggle when man will be
reunited with his products and achieve perfection.
[Ref. 11: p. 3]
It was with this philosophy that Marx and Engels
wrote the Communist Manifesto in 1848. "Workers of all
countries, unite!" was their call for the world revolution
which would defeat Capitalism. Marx's ideas of production
and the economic foundation of society were further
elaborated in the three volume work, Das Kapital
,
published
between 1867 and 1895. Marx used his materialist philosophy
to predict social developments such as a war emerging from
the 1848 worker uprisings, the polarization of European
society, and the defeat of nationalism; none of which have
yet occurred [Ref. 3: pp. 38-39].
4. Lenin's Interpretations
Vladimir Il'ich Lenin is the "prophet" of Communism,
"the brilliant successor to the revolutionary teachings of
K. Marx and F. Engels, and the founder of our [Communist]
Party and the Soviet state." [Ref. 13: p. 1] Lenin is all
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but worshiped by the Soviet people, who line up daily to see
his body in the mausoleum on Red Square. He is the man who
having absorbed all the wisdom of the history of mankind
. . . was able with all dialectical comprehensiveness to
embrace the objective logic of the development of social
events; and by the force of his brilliant intellect to
expound on a new field of social processes to the most
profound depths. [Ref. 13: p. 1]
Lenin saw the problems of Marxism and developed his
own philosophy. He decided that the world revolution would
occur in "the weakest links of Capitalism," vice
industrialized nations. He also saw politics, vice
economic conditions, at the foundation of society.
[Ref. 3: p. 39] Lenin could not wait for the final
"synthesis" and thus took it upon himself to organize the
revolution which would bring about Communism. For this task
he developed the Bolshevik (Majority) Party and literally
seized power overnight. The Bolsheviks were, ironically,
much smaller than the Mensheviks (Minority) , and Lenin
himself was astounded when the revolution succeeded. He
trulv believed that Capitalism would be defeated, as he
considered it to be in its final stage: imperialism. Like
those of Marx, however, Lenin's predictions of world
revolution and the worker's paradise have not come to pass.
The Soviet leadership does not always seem to adhere to the
principles of Marxism-Leninism. This has brought question
to the basic hypothesis that the ideology is indeed the
basis for all thought within the Soviet Union.
24
C. CRITICISM OF THE IDEOLOGY
Many analysts discount the power of Marxism-Leninism and
contend that it is actually foreign to most nationalities
within the USSR. The basis of this argument is that
Marxism-Leninism is an "adopted worldview" which was imposed
on the various cultures of the Soviet empire with the
intention of "remaking that culture in a Marxist-Leninist
image." [Ref. 4: p. 31] In supporting this argument one
must remember that the Soviet Union is comprised of fifteen
republics, once nations in their own right. It is an empire
whose population includes over a hundred nationalities
ranging from European and Asian to Middle Eastern. Although
Great Russians are the largest single ethnic group and hold
most of the Party power, their numbers are slipping to below
50 percent of the total population. There has been recent
speculation on the decline of the ideology, an attitude that
it has worn out its usefulness and run out of
rationalizations if the USSR is to remain a superpower. In
this respect, something must be done to revive the Soviet
economy in particular, and Marxism-Leninism has no more
answers.
The first rejection of these arguments is that there is
no internal indication of such an ideological decline.
Despite General Secretary Gorbachev's policies of glasnost
and perestroyka (which shall be presented in more detail
later), current Soviet writings remain ideologically pure,
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and Gorbachev himself is a strong purveyor of Marxism-
Leninism. In fact, the ideology is ultimately all that
keeps the CPSU in power. That is, Marxism-Leninism provides
legitimacy for the Communist Party to prescribe the path
towards achievement of the worker's paradise. As stated
earlier, the leadership has the task of "guiding" history
towards its inevitable conclusion. Therefore, "as long as
the CPSU maintains its position as the single source of
power in the state, positions in the military, foreign, and
internal policy will be perceived against a backdrop of the
Marxist-Leninist ideology." [Ref. 14: p. 34]
Furthermore, and most importantly, Marxism-Leninism
would not have been accepted into the new Bolshevik state
unless it brought with it some aspects of the Russian
"national character." [Ref. 4: p. 3 2] One Soviet emigre has
provided an excellent example of such characteristics in the
following passage:
The basic "laws" of [the] Marxist dialectic can be
detected in the patterns of thinking of most Soviet
people, even those who are radical opponents of Communism,
it becomes clear that although people of Soviet
mentality reject the notion of class struggle as the main
driving force behind all social changes, they do perceive
the world as divided into two opposite poles which are in
constant conflict, the energy emanating from which drives
the process of change; this is essentially the number one
"law" of [the] Marxist dialectic. [Ref. 15]
With these thoughts in mind it is necessary to review
those aspects of the Russian "national character" which play
a role in the Soviet officer's actions. The inter-
26
relationship of these factors with Marxism-Leninism provides
i
i
a remarkable influence over Soviet thoughts and decisions.
27
III. CULTURAL AND IDEOLOGICAL INFLUENCES
A. RUSSIA AND THE SOVIET UNION
Russia is to the Soviet Union as a man is to the disease
afflicting him. . . . the word Russia can serve only to
designate an oppressed people denied the possibility of
acting as one entity or to denote its suppressed national
consciousness, religion, and culture. Or else it can
point to a future nation liberated from Communism.
Alexander Solzhenitsyn, "The Mortal Danger."
Before reviewing the combined influences of the
"Russian" tradition and the "Soviet" ideology, one must
understand the difference between Russia and the Soviet
Union. Although such a clarification may seem quite
elementary, most Americans still refer to the Soviet Union
as Russia and consequently make no distinction between
Russians and any other nationality within the USSR. This
lack of distinction was even widespread in American academic
literature on the Soviet Union until the 1960s and is
occasionally present today.
The Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics is just
that: a union of fifteen republics. These include the
Byelorussian (White Russian) , Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian,
Moldavian, Ukrainian, Armenian, Azer baidzhan, Georgian,
Kazakh, Kirghiz, Tadzhik, Turkmen, and Uzbek Soviet
Socialist Republics (SSRs) , and the Russian Soviet Federated
Socialist Republic (RSFSR). The latter of these is by far
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the largest republic and that which is commonly known as
Rossiya (Russia). As mentioned previously, ethnic Russians
comprise the majority of the USSR's population (although
their percentage is decreasing), and Russian is the official
language of the Soviet Union. Russians also hold a vast
majority of the elite governmental positions, which has
resulted in the "Russification" of the Soviet Union. That
is, a program of emphasis on the Russian culture and
language in a collectivization process. When drafted into
the military, for example, the various ethnic groups are
sent far away from their own cultures. When local
traditions are tolerated (which is very much the case in
Georgia and increasingly so in the Baltic republics), they
still must not challenge Moscow or the ideology.
[Ref. 16: p. 68]
Next, the proper definition of a Soviet must be
addressed. The Russian word soviet literally means council
,
although Americans do not translate it as such into English.
In one respect, a Soviet is any citizen of the USSR,
regardless of nationality. On the other hand, a Soviet must
not be mistaken for a Russian when discussed in the context
of a governmental or military role. For example, a Soviet
officer may be Russian, but Russian officers and armed
forces do not exist. When patriotism is required, however,
the Soviets call upon the Russian national character. "It
was not for the slogans of Marx and Lenin that the Russian
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people fought so bravely [during World War II] , but for
their 'Motherland'." [Ref. 16: p. 65]
B. THE RUSSIAN NATIONAL CHARACTER
While the Marxist-Leninist ideology affects all aspects
of Soviet life, the influence of Russian history cannot be
underestimated when addressing Soviet thoughts and values.
The following description of the development of the Russian
national character since the thirteenth century will reveal
attitudes and preconceptions which bear a striking
resemblance to those inherent in the twentieth-century
Soviet Union.
The key word to understanding Russian tradition and its
role in the Soviet Union is survival . The Russians are a
people who have "witnessed frequent wars, foreign invasions,
bloody governmental repression, and domestic upheavals"
throughout their existence [Ref. 16: p. 65], The terrain
provides Moscow with no protective barriers, and the plains
are easily crossed, resulting in conflict upon conflict in
and around Mother Russia. Nevertheless, the Russians have
survived and expanded their borders outward from the
homeland. They have turned survival into an art, a
necessary pursuit in a world of enemies. The resulting
obsession with security and secretiveness at any cost is
often perceived in the West as a paranoia. A more accurate
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observation would be the unavoidable development of a
"fortress" mentality in the interests of survival. [Ref. 16]
1. The Peasant Class
By the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, a
peasant class had developed around a village culture. This
society revolved around an autocratic organization of
"elders," leaders who were not chosen but who emerged.
Among them was a front man who became the conveyer for the
collective. No one asked about the elders or village
structure because those who needed to know were informed,
and those who asked were punished or executed. This culture
was never officially institutionalized and yet remained
intact until the Stalinist purges of the 1930s and 1940s. It
was a secret society in which the elders decided everything.
There was no individualism, as unanimity was demanded and
cruelty was the consequence. Without the collective an
individual could not survive. Likewise, the village took no
risks in its own survival and thus rejected any innovation
or change. Many Soviet leaders, including Gorbachev, have
emerged from this culture. [Ref. 17]
2. The Princely Court
The emergence of the Princely Court resulted in a
political separation of this class and the peasants. The
problem for both, however, remained survival. The Grand
Prince of Moscow absorbed all the neighboring
principalities. He deprived his potential rivals of their
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independent bases of political and economic power by making
them servators of his court. Nobles were members of family
clans, each of which had a leader; but the Tsar kept reigns
on all the clans as they constantly orbited around him. The
state was the prize of the government, vice the opposite.
This emerging concept of centralized leadership
prevented chaos in the system. Chaos in the Russian culture
represents risk and thus threatens survival of the
collective. Imposing one's will through total domination and
control preserves order in the system and is basic to the
Russian mentality. This system, like the peasant class,
existed until the early twentieth century. In order to
operate, however, it depended on a staff which eventually
emerged into a Serving Class, or bureaucracy. [Ref. 17]
3 . The Serving Class
This class included the church, military, police,
and government staff. There was no political power here.
Importance was according to function vice status, and by the
mid-nineteenth century changes began to occur rapidly in
Imperial Russia.
In September 1812 Napoleon occupied Moscow, which
was subsequently burned by the Russians themselves in an
attempt to make it untenable for the foreign armies. Within
five weeks Napoleon was unable to call a truce with the Tsar
(or to maintain his troops away from France) and thus
retreated. By March 1814, the Allies in turn occupied
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Paris. While in Paris, Russian officers were able to learn
more about western liberalism. These officers later began
forming opposition to the Tsar through secret societies.
After the death of Tsar Alexander I in 1825, the
"Northern Society" (which favored a constitutional monarchy
and the abolition of serfdom) staged the ill-fated
"Decembrist Revolution." Tsar Nicholas I was able to
immediately supress the uprising. Although he saw the need
for reforms, Nicholas was vehemently opposed to such
independent public activity. He imposed measures of
censorship and control of education and used secret police
in a move towards the repression of liberalism. Opposition
to his bureaucratic rule, however, continued and was able to
gain influence as Russia suffered defeats in the Crimean
War.
Alexander II became Tsar in 1855 and began to
implement reforms including liberation of the serfs and a
system of self-government. The liberals, however, demanded
more, and the political culture was unable to keep pace with
the reforms. Internal unrest grew over several decades
until Lenin siezed power in the midst of chaos in 1917. The
Soviet state was born. [Ref. 10: pp. 7 49-56]
While this encapsulation does not presume to
provide an adequate review of Russian history, it does
indicate that collectivization, centralized control, risk-
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avoidance, secretiveness, and mistrust are not exclusively
Communist characteristics but deeply Russian as well.
C. THE SOVIET AND AMERICAN MENTALITIES
For a better understanding of the Soviet officer's
preconceptions in the field of military affairs, one must
realize how the previously mentioned cultural factors and
their relation to the ideology influence his values.
Examples of contrast with American cultural influences will
further emphasize the radical differences between the two.
Perhaps the most useful source in understanding general
cultural influences and differences is Edward Hall's
Beyond Culture [Ref. 18]. Hall's book provides an
invaluable awareness of that which most Americans take for
granted. His argument is as follows:
The cultural and psychological insight that is
important for us to accept is that denying culture and
obscuring the effects that it can have on human talents
can be as destructive and potentially dangerous as denying
evil. [Ref. 18: p. 7]
Hall explains the delineation between what he terms "high
context" and "low context" cultures (with the explanation
that neither is better nor worse than the other) . High
context cultures are characterized by a conceptual outlook
on the world and life. Everything is based on a "big
picture," and conformity is the rule. The USSR is a high
context culture. Low context cultures are very
individualistic and stress details rather than concepts.
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They emphasize paired opposites of "either/or" without
accounting for an alternative. The U.S. is a low context
culture. Hall awakens his readers to actions that are often
considered human nature but are actually products of
cultural influence. His book should be required reading for
any military personnel who encounter foreign cultures,
whether it be in battle or simply stationing overseas.
1. Contrasting Mentalities
In evaluating the Soviet officer and his
preconceptions, it becomes apparent that his actions are
indeed products of culture. This culture includes a mixture
of such concepts as the Russian political tradition, the
Russian national character, the Russian Orthodox Church, the
Communist ideology, and even geography in comprising what
may be termed "The Soviet Mentality." [Ref. 19: pp. 2-4]
In both the U.S. and USSR the process of
socialization and, thus, the understanding of mentality can
be seen through "channels of influence" which shape the
lives and values of their citizens. In the United States,
these are the family, school, church, mass media, and the
"street." (The last being all unorganized influences such as
peers, neighbors, strangers, etc.) Soviet channels of
influence, however, do not include the church or the mass
media as separate entities. These have been absorbed into
the "school" channel, which actually includes all official
organizations and is the channel through which the Party
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promotes ideology. For example, the church is tolerated
"to the extent that Christian ethics coincide with official
Communist ethics, a phenomenon which is not very extensive."
Furthermore, censorship has prevented the mass media from
developing in the Soviet Union as it has in the United
States. The media exists primarily as a propaganda tool
and, like other official institutions, must reflect the
ideology. Therefore, it too can be included in the
"school. " This official channel competes with the family
and street influences, resulting in Soviet citizens learning
to live two lives: one with those they can trust, and one
with those they cannot trust. [Ref. 19: pp. 19-2 2]
These influences are in constant conflict and result
in an almost schizophrenic suspicion and internal mistrust
among the people, as well as a xenophobic fear. "Trust
requires taking risks; the Russians prefer suspicion, which
averts risks, in its stead." [Ref. 20: p. 134] This
conflict supports the tenets of the Marxist-Leninist
dialectic and produces a precise understanding of who one's
"enemies" are. Americans, on the other hand, "have
difficulty perceiving someone as a permanent or mortal
enemy. The concept of an indefinite struggle is completely
alien to him." Furthermore, because of the American's
distaste for confrontation, he "perceives compromise as the
essence of a deal" and is receptive to any expression of
friendliness. "For him, a concession is a manifestation of
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self-confidence and good-will, not a bribe intended to
ensure good treatment [as it is from a Soviet perspective]."
[Ref. 19: pp. 44-45]
Another important value shaped by channels of
influence in both societies is the notion of truth . In the
United States, suppression or alteration of the truth is
seen in a negative aspect. For Americans, censorship and
propaganda represent such suppression and alteration and are
unacceptable. In the Soviet Union, however, propaganda is
an "idealized truth" and has no negative connotation. Truth
is revealed through the ideology and the CPSU.
[Ref. 7: p. 2] As they are seldom exposed to information
opposing the Party line, Soviet citizens have developed a
unique style of both reading and writing to filter official
censorship [Ref. 16: p. 6 6] .
Finally, the concept of time is important in
evaluating the Soviet and American mentalities. As already
stated, Marxism-Leninism has no timetable by which
Capitalism must be defeated. This concept is apparent in
Soviet daily life as well. Soviets tend to live in the past
and the future. In this respect, they are "surviving" the
present. They view life in terms of what will be achieved
but are in no hurry. The inevitable will eventually come
about.
Americans, on the other hand, see the "American
Dream" as being available today and thus live in the
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present. They expect rapid changes in life and prepare very
little for the future. They are also less aware of the
relevance of the historical past. The goal is to achieve
something and move on. Americans seem obsessed with saving
time in hopes that more might be accomplished and are rarely
willing to be patient in achieving long term goals. This
notion is prevalent in the U.S. political system and even
military officer rotations, where changes occur every few
years. Some analysts have noted that the Soviets understand
this American trait and perceive the U.S. as quick to make
concessions in the search for a deal. [Ref. 7: p. 17]
To continue presenting the differences between
American and Soviet cultural influences could be endless.
At this point the necessity of evaluating the enemy from his
own perspective should be apparent. The following passage
provides a summation of the contrasting mentalities:
From the American point of view . . . such traits as
having double standards, not living in the present,
blaming the system for personal failures, suspiciousness,
and so on, are symptoms of schizoid disorders and criteria
which we associate with a loser.
From the Soviet point of view, however, suspiciousness
is a sign of psychological maturity; blaming the system is
a sign of political maturity; the ability to discriminate
friends from enemies is a sign of intellectual maturity,
some qualities of American mentality look like signs
of emotional and intellectual immaturity, selfishness,
social coldness, and so on. [Ref. 19: p. 50]
2. The Military Mentality
From the understanding of these differences in
mentality it will be useful to apply a simple example from
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the military to develop the necessity of proper perception
even further. In the United States, service to the country
results from a "manifestation of affection" rather than a
duty [Ref. 19: p. 45] . In the Soviet conscriptive system,
however, service is a duty to defend the homeland, a matter
of honor and conscience [Ref. 21: p. 9],
Interestingly, these differences in the mindsets of
Soviet and U.S. military officers are evident even in the
content of their respective oaths of office. It is
important to note in this comparison that both Soviet
officers and enlisted personnel take the same oath,
reflecting the ideological concept of a classless society.
The respective Soviet and U.S. oaths are as follows:
The Oath of Allegiance
I, citizen of the Union of the Soviet Socialist
Republics, joining the ranks of the Armed Forces, take the
oath and solemnly pledge to be a conscientious, brave,
disciplined and vigilant warrior, strictly to observe
military and state secrets, to observe the constitution of
the USSR and Soviet laws, unquestioningly to carry out the
requirements of all military regulations and orders of
commanders and superiors.
I pledge conscientiously to study military science, to
preserve in every way military and public property and to
remain devoted till my last breath to my people, my Soviet
homeland and the Soviet government.
I am prepared at all times, on orders from the Soviet
government to come out in defense of my homeland, the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. I pledge to defend it
courageously, skillfully, with dignity and honour, without
sparing my blood and life in securing complete victory
over the enemies.
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If I break this solemn vow, may I be severely punished
by the Soviet people, universally hated, and despised by
the working people. [Ref. 21]
The Oath of Office
I, [name], having been appointed [rank] in the
[appropriate service] under the conditions indicated in
this document, do accept such appointment and do solemnly
swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the
Constitution of the United States against all enemies,
foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and
allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation
freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of
evasion; and that I will well and faithfully discharge the
duties of the office on which I am about to enter, so help
me God. [Ref. 2 2]
The differences in these documents reflect the
differences of the men who take them, as well as the
societies which administer them. While much time could be
spent evaluating the semantics of these oaths, the more
important differences lie in their themes.
The Soviet oath is much more elaborate in its
delineation of required qualities of a military
servicemember, his actions in "defense of the homeland," and
actions to be taken against him if he fails. It calls for
his carrying out the orders of superiors (also included in
the U.S. military enlisted oath) and the securing of
complete victory over enemies. This reflects the very
nature of the Soviet mentality with the need to be part of a
collective rather than an individual. The oath is
considered a "vow to the people, the Party and Lenin, leader
of the revolution, to fight heroically for the righteous
cause of the workers and peasants." [Ref. 21: p. 9]
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The U.S. Oath of Office is, however, almost
i
i
legalistic in nature and much more general in its rhetoric.
It leaves much room for individualism by not defining the
traits required of a good servicemember. Furthermore, this
oath is taken by all elected or appointed officials in an
office of "honor or profit in the civil service or uniformed
services" of the U.S. government [Ref. 23]. The rhetoric of
the U.S. oath reaffirms the Soviet perception of the U.S.
Armed Forces as mercenary and based on subordination of the
working class. In Soviet terms, the Oath of Allegiance
merely establishes the requirements under which the Soviet
citizen will execute his responsibility to defend the
homeland.
D. THE SOVIET MILITARY EXPERIENCE
A final influence which must be reviewed in
understanding Soviet thoughts, decisions, and actions is the
Soviet military experience, particularly that of World War
II. As already discussed, the Russian and Soviet
experiences of war have been many and have resulted in the
development of a fortress mentality. These experiences have
"made them strangely blind to such contradictory actions as
the deployment of SS-20 nuclear missiles facing Western
Europe while professing their 'peace-loving' intentions."
[Ref. 16: pp. 65-66] The United States, on the other hand,
has enjoyed the luxury of geographic isolation and, thus, a
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military tradition which perceives the defense of American
interests (vice territory) as the primary objective.
In understanding the Soviet military experience and the
concept of "defense of the homeland," a most sobering
perspective for an American is to realize the losses taken
by the Soviet Union during World War II. The USSR lost 10
percent (usually quoted at around twenty million lives) of
its population during that war. This was in addition to the
deliberate collectivization and famine and political purges
carried out by Stalin before the war. These accounted for
several million more deaths. In fact, three of Stalin's five
senior military officers were themselves executed. Such
executions resulted in junior officers rapidly assuming
command positions. For example, Admiral of the Fleet of the
Soviet Union, Sergei Gorshkov, achieved flag rank at the age
of thirty-one and was appointed Commander in Chief of the
Soviet Navy at forty-five (in 1956), where he served until
1985. The devastation of this period has never been equaled
in the U.S. and is thus incomprehensible in American
society. Furthermore, the effects of losing more than a
generation of the male population is not likely to stop
affecting the USSR for several decades to come. To put
this in a more vivid perspective, the Soviet Union lost more
men in the siege of Leningrad alone than the United States
has lost in every battle since the American Revolution
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[Ref . 24: p. 36] I In fact, it is difficult to find a Soviet
citizen over the age of fifty who
has not killed someone, who was not wounded himself, who
was not a prisoner or a prison guard, who did not suffer
starvation or did not see peasants dead of starvation
. . . who did not deport peasants to Siberia or did not
lose all his property himself. [Ref. 19: p. 38]
The next step in understanding the Soviet from his own
perspective is to study how institutional factors influence
his thoughts and actions. An introduction to the Soviet
serviceman's training and education, combined with
applications of leadership and initiative, will further
reveal the vast differences between the Soviet and American
mentalities.
43
IV. THE SOVIET SERVICEMAN
A serviceman in the Armed Forces of the USSR is a
defender of his motherland— the Union of the Soviet
Socialist Republics.
A serviceman must observe the laws sacredly and be
true to the military oath; must be disciplined, honest,
just and brave, and must spare no resources, not even life
itself, in the fulfillment of his military duty; he must
obey his commanders implicitly and defend them in battle;
and guard his unit's banner as the cherished symbol that
it is.
Internal Service Regulations of
the Armed Forces of the USSR
While even the Soviets admit that there are problems of
apathy among young conscripts and difficulty in instilling
the sense of duty mentioned above, the effects of military
service (like the ideology) cannot be escaped. The armed
forces are viewed as "one" with the Soviet citizens. They
are "not just a school of military expertise, but also a
school of ideological and physical conditioning, discipline
and organization." [Ref. 25: p. 10 2] This view of the armed
forces reemphasizes the concept of a collective throughout
society, the development of a "soldier-citizen. n The
conscriptive system gives all young Soviet men (with very
few exceptions) a common frame of reference for the rest of
their lives. Furthermore, all Soviet children are
indoctrinated in military affairs through youth
organizations, paramilitary groups, textbooks, and even
spor ts.
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The Appendix provides a concise overview of military
indoctrination and service. The following review of Soviet
military pedagogy will address some specifics of
indoctrination, training, and education, emphasizing the
differences between U.S. and Soviet military service. A
more thorough examination of Soviet manpower, training, and
mobilization can be found in Harriet and William Scott's
book, The Armed Forces of the USSR [Ref. 26]. This work is
perhaps the definitive Western source on Soviet military
affairs and is required reading for any student of Soviet
studies.
A. INDOCTRINATION, TRAINING, AND EDUCATION
These elements of Soviet military service are included
in the field of military pedagogy, which is defined as
the science of communist education, training and
indoctrination of Soviet soldiers and of the preparation
of subunits and units (or ships) for successful operation
under the conditions of modern warfare. [Ref. 27: p. 7]
Military pedagogy is considered a component part of
"military science" (to be presented in Chapter V), which
provides it with a "theoretical military foundation." As
with all else in Soviet military affairs, however, the
Colonel William F. Scott, USAF (Ret.), served in Moscow
as Senior Air Attache (1962-64) and later as Defense and Air
Attache (1970-72). Harriet Fast Scott is a consultant on
Soviet military affairs and a member of the General Advisory
Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament. They maintain
the largest private library of Soviet military publications
in the United States.
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"methodological foundation" of military pedagogy is provided
by the "Marxist-Leninist philosophy--dialectical and
historical materialism." [Ref. 27: p. 12]
Despite their ideological foundation, the roles of
indoctrination, training, and education in the Soviet
military are not unlike those in the U.S. Indoctrination is
considered a process of influencing a serviceman's
"consciousness, feeling, and will" by instilling in them
"conviction, moral traits, behavioral patterns, and skills"
that are relative to their particular branch of the armed
forces. Training provides specific "scientific knowledge,
skills, and abilities" for performing their duties.
Finally, education "presupposes a certain level of
preparedness" and can provide a general knowledge of
principles or specific knowledge for a certain level of
qualification. The primary differences between these Soviet
and thair corresponding U.S. concepts lie in their content
and manner of application. [Ref. 27: pp. 8-9]
In the Soviet Union, the military permeates all aspects
of life. In addition to the ever-present war memorials,
slogans, and banners, the following factors represent just a
few of the influences of military affairs over society:
* Army garrison commanders automatically hold office in
the administrative councils of garrison towns.
* The military industries take priority over civilian
concerns in economic life.
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* The military medical services constitute the senior
branch of the Soviet national health system.
* The army is used on a large scale every year to help in
the harvest.
* Large-scale military exercises and parades bring the
military into the public eye.
* A great deal of railway, pipe line , and industrial
construction is performed by military engineering units.
* Weekly television programs on basic military training
("I Serve the Soviet Union") are shown throughout the
country.
* War memorials and museums are guarded by military or
Komsomol guards.
* Even the newly wedded bride is expected to lay her
bridal wreath on the local memorial of the unknown
soldier. [Ref. 28: pp. 15-16]
This continuous military presence affects the Soviet
youth as well. As discussed previously, the school and
family influences have a lasting effect on Soviet children.
The potential of these forces in developing patriotic fervor
is not hidden but encouraged in Soviet writings.
Patriots are not born. They are molded. They are
forged by the Soviet way of life, the family and school,
our social organization, labor and troop collectives, and
the entire system for ideological-political, labor, and
moral indoctrination. [Ref. 29]
1. Indoctrination of Youth
Organized military indoctrination of Soviet youth
begins in school. Russian language textbooks include
readings on Soviet missiles and the strength of the Soviet
Army. One textbook, entitled Rusky Ya zy k u kartinkakh
[Russian Language in Drawings], asks seven year old children
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what they would like to be when they grow up. The possible
answers include five illustration of "a tank commander, a
jet fighter pilot, an armed marine, a frontier guard and a
man sitting behind the panel ready to press the buttons for
the missiles to be fired." [Ref. 30: p. 68] School physical
education programs are called "Ready for Labor and Defense"
(GTO) , and include such activities as grenade throwing,
cross-country skiing, and marksmanship. In 1977, over one
million children received marksmanship ratings
[Ref. 31: pp. 607-8].
Furthermore, children are expected to join one of
the three Soviet youth groups: The Little Octobrists, Young
Pioneers, or Komsomol (see Appendix). Americans sometimes
equate these organizations to the Boy and Girl Scouts of
America and the Explorers program. This comparison is
inaccurate because these Soviet organizations (primarily the
Komsomol) are considered a major step towards higher
education and Communist Party membership. They are also
another avenue for military indoctrination. The Young
Pioneers handbook, Tovarishch [Comrade], contains an
attractive section on the Soviet Armed Forces, including
pictures of equipment, military ranks and insignias, as well
as descriptions of the various branches of service
[Ref. 26: p. 331].
An additional institutional influence is the
Volunteer Society for Cooperation with the Army, Aviation,
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and the Fleet (DOSAAF), which provides pre-draft training to
youths at least 14 years of age. A primary purpose of
DOSAAF is to train future draftees in their prospective
military specialties. DOSAAF operates airfields, sports
complexes, and a publishing house. The organization also
provides its services to the civilian population to improve
the quality of Soviet workers. [Ref. 2 8: pp. 32 6-2 8]
Yet another method of preparing youth for military
service is provided through military-sports games. Two such
games exist on a national level. Zarnitsa [Lightning] is for
third through eighth grade students and reportedly involves
twenty million students annually. The second game, Orlenok
[Eaglet] , is intended for those from 16 to 19 years of age
and involves nine million youths a year. Events include
mapping, marches, tactics, anti-tank and anti-helicopter
defense, and first aid to name a few. [Ref. 31: p. 608]
The result of these various methods of paramilitary
and pre-draft training is that when a young man begins his
basic training and subsequent conscription, he is already
indoctrinated and at least fundamentally trained for his
military duties. More importantly, he is a soldier -citizen,
a member of the collective who is better able to uphold the
ideology. Whether or not he is enthusiastic about his
service, he cannot escape the influence it will have on the
remainder of his life.
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2. Training and Education of Officers
The training and education of Soviet officers is
also quite different from that experienced in the United
States. The USSR maintains approximately 140 military and
higher military schools from which 50,000 active duty
officers are commissioned annually. Most of these schools
include four or five year curricula and confer degrees
roughly equivalent to a bachelor's degree. This is
remarkably different from the U.S. system where only a few
thousand officers graduate annually from the service
academies, while the majority receive their commissions
through respective Officer Candidate programs and Reserve
Officers Training Corps. Another distinction is the
specialization of the Soviet military schools. Each service
maintains schools for particular specialties in addition to
those which prepare line officers. Examples include tank,
navigation, engineering , radioelectronics and construction
schools. Again, these are full-length, academically
rigorous commissioning programs which confer degrees, not
short training courses which are attended after
commissioning. [Ref. 26: pp. 348-70]
The Soviet military also maintains seventeen
"military academies" which are comparable to U.S. service
schools, staff, and war colleges. These schools are usually
attended by officers in their late twenties or early
thirties (with the exception of the more senior Voroshilov
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General Staff Academy) . Attendance is a prerequisite for
advancement to command positions. The difference between
these schools and their U.S. equivalents is again their
duration. Courses at the Soviet military academies are
three to five years long, while those at U.S. staff and war
colleges are usually less than a year (and very often only a
few weeks) in duration. [Ref. 26: p. 370-87]
Graduate degrees in a variety of disciplines are
also available to Soviet officers. These include the
unique degrees of Candidate and Doctor of Military Science.
While the U.S. military maintains graduate schools and also
sends officers to civilian institutions, the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth,
Kansas only began offering the degree of Master of Military
9
Art and Sciences in 1974. Today it remains the only U.S.
military institution to confer such a degree.
The result of the Soviet officer's military
indoctrination, training, and education is a specialization
that does not exist in the United States. While this has
both advantages and disadvantages, it provides the Soviet
with a much different attitude towards his military duties
than that of his American counterpart. An understanding of
this difference alone is helpful in evaluating the Soviet
from his own perspective. One aspect of that perspective
2 This degree was then retroactively conferred to
graduates from as early as 1964.
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which is not only influenced but shaped by an officer's
higher education is his concept of leadership and
initiative. The Soviet's style of leadership and initiative
is central to his thoughts, decisions, and actions.
B. LEADERSHIP AND INITIATIVE
In the United States, the concept of a "born-leader"
holds a positive connotation and sense of respect because
leadership is often considered an intrinsic element of one's
personality, not a quality which can be taught. Leaders
naturally rise to positions of authority and responsibility
as a result of their inherent abilities, not their learned
skills.
In the Soviet Union, on the other hand, a leader is
developed through extensive training and a firm knowledge of
the ideology.
Marxist-Leninist training for officer personnel is the
basis for the successful shaping of commanders. This is
because political maturity and ideological conviction
predetermine the commander's other moral qualities and
fighting efficiency and his will for victory. [Ref. 32]
Thus , "born-leaders" do not exist in the USSR. Leadership
qualities such as initiative are not individual responses
but are developed traits based on combat studies
[Ref. 33: p. 21], Constant education is considered the only
method of attaining the attributes necessary for successful
leadership.
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There exists only one path to the full possession of
these qualities and to the preparedness for accomplishing
the responsible and complex tasks of Armed Forces
service--to firmly remember and sacredly fulfill V. I.
Lenin's behest of learning military affairs in a real way.
Learn always and everywhere. . . . [Ref. 25: p. 190]
This concept sheds light on the importance and strong
influence of a serviceman's lifelong indoctrination and
training. From an American perspective, this notion of
learning to be a leader seems only to reinforce an
assumption that the Soviet commander's actions on the
battlefield are strictly limited, that he is unable to use
his own initiative when the course of a battle changes.
Such an assumption is inaccurate because the Soviet concept
of initiative does allow for a commander's independent
decisions and even risk. The Soviets admit that a
victorious commander supplements orders with inventiveness,
intelligent initiative, and creativity [Ref. 32],
1. Soviet Initiative
The initiative of a commander is defined as
(1) A creative, informal solution by a subordinate
commander (commanding officer) during an operation (or
battle), which is a part of a mission assigned to him, and
the readiness to take a calculated risk in connection with
such a solution. The initiative of a commanding officer
(commander) consists in striving to find the best method
of fulfilling the assigned mission, in utilizing favorable
opportunities, and in taking the most expedient measures
promptly, without awaiting orders from one's immediate
superior. (2) The ability to impose one's will on the
enemy in the course of an operation (or battle) .
[Ref. 34: p. 92]
The key phrase in this definition is "calculated risk"
because such calculation preserves order in an otherwise
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inherently chaotic situation. In this context, the Soviet
commander may only take a risk under certain conditions and
circumstances. Surprise is an essential element in this
equation, as it is a method of imposing one's will (and
tactics) on the enemy. Use of surprise in taking risks,
however, is based on sound tactical training and knowledge
of the enemy. [Ref. 35: p. 45] In this respect, a commander
may take a risk and display the necessary initiative when he
has a complete understanding of the situation, including
both his own and the enemies capabilities, and has the skill
to carry out the necessary maneuver. Most importantly, the
commander who conducts proper training under a variety of
possible conditions and strives to improve and perfect his
tactics will be able to take such risks when unexpected
circumstances arise. [Ref. 36: p. 46]
The Soviet solution to risk-taking is to minimize
the effect of uncertainty (which represents a loss of
control) if not prevent it altogether. This is accomplished
through predvidenie [foresight] and prognozirovanie
[forecasting] . These concepts are essential tools of the
Soviet commander in the process of command and control and,
as might be expected, hold quite different meanings from a
Soviet perspective than an American one.
2. Soviet Foresight and Forecasting
In the most fundamental terms, foresight is the
ability to comprehend future conditions and forecasting is
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the action taken to influence those conditions. Foresight
is considered possible because (according to Marxism-
Leninism) nothing is unknowable, whether it be in the past,
present, or future. There are only "things, phenomena, and
processes that are not yet comprehended."
[Ref. 37: pp. 24-25] Foresight should not be perceived as
prediction because this implies "passive" acceptance of an
inevitable future. Such a view eliminates the requirement
for the subsequent guidance of future events (forecasting).
More accurately, it is considered a weapon to be used
against an enemy through action upon the objective world.
[Ref. 38: pp. 1, 6] The following explanation of foresight
also indicates the Soviet understanding of the importance of
knowing the enemy and avoiding value-projection.
Military foresight is possible only where there is a
comprehensive study, taking into account all the elements
of the situation; a profound understanding of the goals
and missions of impending military operations; knowledge
of, and allowance for, factors which can influence the
development of events; and above all, an excellent
knowledge of the enemy, and an absence of bias in
assessing his activities. The ability to foresee is a
necessary quality for every commanding general (or
commander, staff officer). . . . [Ref. 34: p. 172]
In short, foresight allows the commander to better
apply himself on the battlefield. With his firm grasp of
Marxism-Leninism, extensive training and education, and the
resulting development of initiative and foresight, the
Soviet officer is equipped to meet and secure victory over
the enemy in a future war. This is when he will apply his
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knowledge of military art, which is the "theory and practice
of engaging in combat, operations, and armed conflict as a
whole . . . [and] is the main field of military science."
[Ref. 34: p. 39] Furthermore, because of the constant
qualitative transformation of weaponry in the twentieth
century, military science must look to the future by
utilizing foresight. This utilization will be apparent in
an introduction and evaluation of the Soviet concepts of
military doctrine, science, and art (and its component
parts: strategy, operational art, and tactics). This review
will include a comparison of equivalent U.S. concepts and
hopefully provide the reader with a better understanding of
Soviet military thought.
56
V. SOVIET VERSUS U.S. MILITARY CONCEPTS
This chapter will be an introduction to the Soviet
concepts of military doctrine, science, and art, including
military strategy, operational art, and tactics. These
concepts are at the foundation of a Soviet officer's
training and education and serve as his necessary "tools"
for encountering the enemy. This presentation will be
limited to providing the U.S. officer with a realization of
the differences (or similarities) between these Soviet
concepts and their U.S. equivalents (which do not exist in
every case). In the United States, military doctrine,
science, and art have general meanings. Soviet applications
are, on the other hand, very precise and based upon the
"scientific" theory of Marxism-Leninism. Thus, to evaluate
Soviet military literature without an understanding of the
Soviet definitions and applications of these concepts could
lead to erroneous conclusions. [Ref. 26: p. 74] More
importantly, to evaluate Soviet actions in combat from an
American perspective could be disastrous.
It must be understood that a complete presentation of
these concepts would be infinite in scope, as these elements
of military affairs represent full academic disciplines in
the Soviet Union. There is no shortage of translated Soviet
military literature on these subjects. The U.S. Air Force
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has translated and published twenty-one such books under the
Soviet Military Thought series. Harriet and William Scott
give excellent coverage to each of these concepts, including
their historical development, in The Armed Forces of the
USSR . The Scotts have also compiled and edited The Soviet
Art of War [Ref. 39], a collection of Soviet writings on
doctrine, strategy, and tactics from 1917 to 1979.
A. MILITARY DOCTRINE
Soviet military theory begins with the concept of
military doctrine, which has no structured counterpart in
the West. The Soviets emphasize, however, that every state
has its own doctrine, the content of which is "determined by
the character of the social system of the state and its
policy." [Ref. 2 5: pp. 272-73] They define it in generic
terms and write often about U.S. military doctrine.
In 1985, Colonel General Makhmut Akhmetovich Gareyev,
Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Eorces
and Doctor of Military Science, gave M. V. Frunze credit
for "establishing the principles of Soviet military
"3
Mikhail Vasil'yevich Frunze is placed just after Lenin
as the founder of the Red Army. He became chief of staff of
the Red Army in May 1924 and relieved Leon Trotsky (actually
responsible for the Army's establishment) as people's
commissar for military and naval affairs in January 1925.
He was placed in the hospital for minor surgery under
Stalin's orders in October 1925 and mysteriously died after
the operation. [Ref. 39: p. 27]
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doctrine." [Ref. 40: p. 86] Frunze provided the following
definition in 1921:
A "unified military doctrine" is a teaching adopted by the
army of a particular state establishing the nature of the
armed forces development, the methods of troop combat
training and the methods of troop management, based on the
states prevailing views on the nature of the military
missions lying before it and the means for executing them,
which are dependent on the class nature of the state and
are defined by the level to which the countries
productive forces have developed. [Ref. 39: p. 29]
While the content of Soviet military doctrine has gone
through several official changes in the past sixty-six
years, this definition remains virtually unchanged. The
latest restatement was made in 1982 by Marshal of the Soviet
Union N. V. Ogarkov, then chief of the General Staff. This
definition restated "the nature of the military missions
lying before it" as "the nature of a possible future war."
[Ref. 12] In any form, the Soviet definition of doctrine is
quite different from the following U.S. definition:
Fundamental principles by which the military forces or
elements thereof guide their actions in support of
national objectives. It is authoritative but requires
judgment in application. [Ref. 41: p. 118]
These two definitions alone indicate that great differences
exist between U.S. and Soviet perceptions of doctrine.
Perhaps the best U.S. equivalent to Soviet military
doctrine would be a mix between "grand strategy" and
"national security policy." However, even this explanation
is inadequate considering the ambiguity of a grand strategy
in contemporary U.S. policy and the fact that national
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security policy is inherently inconsistent and vague in a
democratic political system where the ' leadership is re-
elected every four years [Ref. 42: pp. 21-22].
In delineating the main concerns of military doctrine,
Marshal of the Soviet Union A. A. Grechko, then Soviet
Minister of Defense, wrote in 1975 that military doctrine
answers the following questions
:
* What enemy will have to be faced in a possible war?
* What is the nature of the war in which the state and its
armed forces will have to take part; what goals and
missions might they be faced with in this war?
* What armed forces are needed to complete the assigned
missions, and in what direction must military
development be carried out?
* How are preparations for war to be implemented?
* What methods must be used to wage war? [Ref. 25: p. 272]
In answering these questions, doctrine ties theory to
practice by pulling together political goals and the
potential and capability to achieve them [Ref. 43]. Frunze
explained this aspect of doctrine by noting that it
consisted of two parts: the technical and the political.
The technical principles of doctrine
encompass questions of organization, training and
employment of the armed forces in war, determine the major
trends for combat employment, the technical equipping, and
the organizational structure of the armed forces; the
development of military art, and the requirements for the
combat training of troops and their combat readiness.
[Ref. 44: p. 406]
The political (and primary) principles, on the other hand,
include
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the propositions revealing the socio-political essence of
war which the imperialists can unleash upon the Soviet
Union, the character of political objectives and the
strategic tasks of the state in it f and their influence on
the construction of the armed forces and the methods of
preparing for and waging war. [Ref. 44: p. 406]
These two aspects are in dialectic unity because the Soviets
consider it impossible to separate war from politics or to
view the technical aspect of doctrine without its political
aspect. [Ref. 40: p. 88]
The importance of this concept is that the political
aspect, while having the requirement of considering
military-technical capabilities, is superior to the
military aspect of doctrine. This idea is in keeping with
the Leninist approach, influenced by Clausewitz , that war
is the continuation of politics by more violent means. Thus,
from the Soviet perspective, the Western idea of hardware as
the primary threat is flawed. Frunze even said in his
Selected Works that "the decisive role is played not by
equipment as behind the equipment there always is a live
man, without whom the equipment is dead." [Ref. 40: p. 98]
From the understanding that Marxism-Leninism dictates
doctrine in theory and that the Party is the keeper of the
ideology (and doctrine) as it is practiced, one can deduce
4Karl von Clausewitz was a ninteenth-century Prussian
Army General whose eight-book collection, On War , contended
that "war is nothing but the continuation of policy with
other means." Clausewitz' s writings are often considered to
be relevant even today. [Ref. 45]
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that the "doctrine says that the Party says what the
doctrine says." [Ref. 5: p. 2] This further emphasizes the
political aspect's superiority and reinforces the absolute
"truth" of the ideology. This entire concept may be
difficult for the U.S. officer to grasp because he has no
equivalent for comparison. He must remember, however, that
while the Soviet officer may not always know the precise
laws of war as laid out by the Marxist-Leninist ideology, he
must be able to substantiate his decisions based on an
official Party pronouncement [Ref. 5: p. 2] .
A final point of importance concerning military doctrine
in the Soviet Union is that it applies to the armed forces
as a whole. There is no separate doctrine for individual
services. It is in essence a doctrine of the state which is
"determined by the general conditions of a state's life and
by its political and social system." [Ref. 40: p. 89]
B. MILITARY SCIENCE
The Soviet concept of military science is another
without equivalence in the United States. In fact, military
science is not even defined by the U.S. Department of
Defense. The primary difficulty in understanding these
Soviet military concepts emanates from this absence of U.S.
equivalents and, consequently, a hierarchy of military
thought. This does not suggest that the Soviet hierarchy is
a superior system but only that the difference between the
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two styles of military thought can result in frequent
misinterpretation. Americans, for example, often confuse
military science and strategy with what is actually
doctrine. [Ref. 42: pp. 31-33]
In the Soviet Union, military doctrine and science are
separate, but interdependent. Doctrine is the "political
policy of the Party" and is partially based on the
"theoretical data of military science," but there can be no
debate in doctrine. In military science, on the other hand,
there can be several points of view and diverse scientific
concepts. It is from these ideas that prospective tenets
are selected and then developed into doctrine.
[Ref. 46: pp. 64-65]
Soviet military science is actually defined as
. a unified system of knowledge about preparation for
and waging of, war in the interests of the defense of the
Soviet Union and other socialist countries against
imperialist aggression.
Armed combat, the chief ingredient of war, is therefore,
the principle research subject of contemporary Soviet
military science. [Ref. 46: pp. 4 7-48]
The components of military science are the theory of
military art, the theory of training and education, the
science of military history, military administration,
military geography, and military technical services
[Ref. 46: p. 50]. Of these, military art is the most
important. Military science is also largely concerned with
the laws of war and armed conflict. These concepts are of
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the utmost importance in understanding Soviet perspectives
on war and will be presented in Chapter VI.
Although U.S. officers may be trained on any of these
subjects at the various staff colleges or postgraduate
institutions, there is no program for the study of all these
disciplines. Furthermore, the education of the U.S. officer
is often limited to his own service. As presented earlier,
degrees in Military Science are conferred in the Soviet
Union at the Candidate and Doctoral levels, and emphasis has
moved closer to a combined arms concept with the elimination
of separate Naval Science degrees in 1979. [Ref. 26: p. 74]
Again, each area of military science is an exhaustive
field of study with precise components and laws. Each of
these laws is based upon the Marxist-Leninist "teachings on
war and the army" and is explainable using dialectical
materialism. Of primary importance to the U.S. officer is
the understanding that Soviet military science is indeed a
scientific discipline comparable to physics or chemistry in
its application. This concept is quite unusual for an
American, as military affairs are not often studied in
mathematical, quantitative terms but are considered more of
an art. From the American perspective war cannot be
considered a science because it has no immutable laws or
applied formulas [Ref. 4: p. 58]. The Soviet military
scientist would reject such a perspective, believing the
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exact opposite to be true. The laws of the dialectic are
themselves considered immutable.
A review of the "science" of military art will better
explain these differing perspectives. In the West, mention
of military art invokes images of brilliant generals and
born-leaders. In the Soviet Union, however, it represents
the essence of military science as a "system of knowledge.
"
C. MILITARY ART
The concept of military art is of the utmost importance
in the theme of "perceiving" the enemy because Soviet and
U.S. perceptions are quite different. "The Soviets tend to
see it as an applied science with immutable laws; Westerners
tend to see it as an art form executed by great captains."
[Ref. 47: p. 123] Before reviewing the principles of
military art, one must understand the context of the English
word "art" and its Russian language counterpart iskusstvo .
In a military context, iskusstvo does not translate into
art and its contrast with science. On the contrary,
iskusstvo is closer to the Western idea of a science than an
art. In evaluating the differences between military art and
military science, Gareyev presents the definition of art as
"a science, knowledge applied to a matter; mastery requiring
great ability." [Ref. 40: p. 107] He substantiates the
interdependence of military science and art by presenting
the following passages from other Soviet military authors:
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Science is the "continuation" of art; in turn art becomes
the "continuation" of science. Any art is more or less
"scientific," and any science is not so scientific to be
able to dispense with art. . . . What is a law in science
is a rule in art. [Ref. 40: p. 112]
Military science is the theory of military affairs. But
military art is the application of the knowledge of
military science in armed combat, the practice of military
affairs which in our age is inconceivable without a
scientific basis. [Ref. 40: p. 114]
Soviet and American views on military art drift even
further apart when their official definitions and principles
are studied. Soviet military art is based upon the "action"
of the specific laws of war and armed conflict, which are
addressed by military science [Ref. 48: p. 121]. The
principles of military art are indeed the "rules" for
conducting armed combat. Soviet military art is officially
defined as
The theory and practice of engaging in combat, operations,
and armed conflict as a whole, with the use of all the
resources of the service branches and Services of the
armed forces, and also support of combat activities in
every regard. Military art, as a scientific theory, is
the main field of military science, and includes tactics,
operational art, and strategy, which constitute an organic
unity and are interdependent. [Ref. 34: p. 29]
Military art is another undefined term in the U.S. military.
It is generally described as "the principles and conduct of
war , and consists of the two divisions of strategy and
tactics (note that there is no operational art in U.S.
military thought)." [Ref. 4: p. 61] It is not surprising
that these differences exist, considering the societal and
ideological differences between the Soviet Union and the
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United States. These differences reinforce the general
hypothesis that, despite ones own beliefs, the enemy must be
recognized from his own perspective in order to be evaluated
properly in combat. The following presentation of the
principles of military art will begin with an example of
non-recognition.
1. An Example of Non-Recognition
A typical example of not recognizing the enemy from
his own perspective is W. K. Sanderson's essay, "The
Military Arts." [Ref. 49], Sanderson reviews the thoughts
of several military theorists from throughout history in an
attempt to define military art, strategy, and tactics. He
comes to the conclusion that terms such as strategy and
tactics should be avoided and not misused. The problem with
Sanderson's conclusion is that he attempts to reduce the
theory of military art and its components to one acceptable
definition. He accepts "the essence of art" in Tolstoy's
definition that "art is an activity by means of which one
man, having experienced a feeling, intentionally transmits
it to another." He further contends that "confidence" is
this feeling in military art. [Ref. 49: p. 35]
Sanderson dismisses the concept of operational art
as having "no place in the trichotomy of the art of war" and
as a "synonym for an undertaking--and no more."
[Ref. 49: p. 38] In reaching his conclusions Sanderson
cites definitions from The Pocket Oxford Dictionary , The
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Oxford Dictionary of English Etymolo gy , and Blackie '
s
Compact Etymological Dictionary .
Despite Mr. Sanderson's own beliefs on military art,
strategy, operational art, and tactics, there is great
danger in dismissing the "scale" of a definition used by
other military thinkers. There _is room for operational art
when dealing with an opponent who considers it a very
important aspect of military affairs. To evaluate the
possible strategic, operational, or tactical actions of a
Soviet commander from a preconceived notion of military art
as a "conveyed feeling of confidence" would be useless.
Such a concept is as alien to that commander as the laws of
the dialectic are to an American. Having emphasized this
necessity of proper recognition, the Soviet and U.S.
concepts of the components of military art can better be
presented.
2. Strategy
Military strategy is the most important component of
military art and is closely related, yet subordinate, to
military doctrine. It is defined in Soviet military
literature as encompassing "the tneory and practice of
preparing the country and the armed forces for war and
planning and conducting war and strategic operations."
[Ref. 50]
Unlike the U.S. concept of different strategies for
different forces (i.e. The Maritime Strategy), Soviet
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military strategy is a combined arms concept to which each
service contributes. Furthermore, a strategic action is an
action which can contribute to the achievement of a war's
political goals, thus showing its subservience to doctrine.
The tasks of Soviet military strategy are:
* Defining under the specific conditions of a war, the
strategic tasks of the armed forces and the necessary
resources for carrying these out.
* The elaboration and implementation of measures to
prepare the armed forces, the theaters of operation as
well as the nation's economy and population for the war,
the planning of the war and strategic operations.
* The organization of the deployment of the armed forces
and their leadership in conducting strategic-scale
operations as well as studying the capabilities of the
probable enemy to wage the war and strategic operations.
[Ref. 51: p. 2]
The following U.S. definition of strategy is much less
encompassing and more vague.
The art and science of developing and using political,
economic, psychological and military forces as necessary
during peace and war, to afford the maximum support to
policies, in order to increase the probabilities and
favorable consequences of victory and to lessen the
chances of defeat. [Ref. 41: p. 346]
[ Military strategy is] the art and science of employing
the armed forces of a nation to secure the objectives of
national policy by the application of force or threat of
force. [Ref. 41: p. 228]
In practice, U.S. military strategy is too often
considered only in the context of strategic nuclear weapons
and thus takes on a global aspect which, in reality, does
not cover the entire concept of "strategic." From either a
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Soviet or U.S. perspective, a weapon need not be
intercontinental as a prerequisite to being strategic.
While a direct correlation between Soviet and U.S.
concepts of military strategy does not exist, the concept of
a "grand strategy" is close to being equivalent
[Ref. 42: pp. 21-22]. This idea can be explained in the
context that U.S. military strategy is a component of grand
strategy, and that while generals develop the former,
statesmen develop the latter [Ref. 4: p. 65] .
3. Operational Art
As a component of Soviet military art, operational
art holds a position between strategy and tactics that is
not generally delineated in Western thought. In fact,
operational art was not a recognized part of Soviet military
art until about 1924 when it was included in studies at the
RKKA Military Academy upon the instruction of M. V. Frunze.
Gareyev marks this inclusion as a "major victory for our
scientific thought. . . . [contributing to] subsequent more
profound and thorough elaboration of the methods for
preparing and conducting operations." [Ref. 40: pp. 154-55]
Operational art is defined as
the theory and practice of preparing for and conducting
combined and independent operations by major field forces
or major formations of the Services. . . . Stemming from
strategic requirements, operational art determines methods
of preparing for and conducting operations to achieve
strategic goals, and gives it the initial data for
tactics. . . . [Furthermore] each service has its own
operational art. [Ref. 34: p. 143]
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The rationale for developing operational art as an
intermediate stage -between strategy and tactics during the
1920s was emergence of the need for "mass armies" to secure
victory. While strategy and tactics were considered
sufficient when one or two engagements were the decisive
elements, the expansion of war during World War I saw the
"rise of the operation as an aggregate of battles and
engagements unified by a single overall plan but broken in
space and time." [Ref. 4 0: p. 154]
This justification is a model example of dialectic
thought in military affairs, as the law of transformation of
quantity into quality is applied. The quantitative increase
in the number of battles required to decide the outcome of
war resulted in the qualitative jump to a new theory of
military art which included operational art as a separate,
yet interdependent theory.
While this emphasizes the scope of Marxism-Leninism
in all aspects of Soviet military thought, it is important
to note that the Soviets also make the mistake of relying on
their own preconceptions in evaluating the West. Gareyev,
for example, makes this mistake in evaluating Western views
on operational art. He first criticizes the "bourgeois"
concept of military art for splitting preparation for the
operation between strategy and tactics. His explanation for
the flaw in this concept is that the "separation of the same
subject of research between two different theories of
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military art cannot be considered scientifically sound, as
it does not reflect the objective nature of modern combat."
[Ref. 40: p. 156]
Gareyev continues by stating that the "bourgeois
military theorists" are beginning to understand this flaw in
their thought. He cites a 19 82 National Defense article
which notes the appearance of operational art in the
doctrine of an "air-land operation" and mentions that
"operational art is beginning to appear in official NATO
documents. " He then states that the bourgeois armies have
(after criticizing Soviet military thought) apparently
accepted the existence of operational art. [Ref. 40: p. 156]
Gareyev has made the same error as Sanderson in
failing to recognize the legitimacy of other modes of
military thought. Just as a Soviet commander would not
consider Sanderson's idea of military art as a "feeling
conveyed," neither would a U.S. commander take account for a
"scientifically sound" method of preparing for the conduct
of an operation. Neither theory is incorrect but simply
based on different preconceptions which are derived from the
values of the respective societies which require the
existence of armed forces. To understand these differences
in evaluating the enemy is to understand the enemy.
4. Tactics
The final and subordinate element of military art is
tactics. Unlike other components of military art, Soviet
72
military tactics are quite similar in scope to those in the
U.S. Armed Forces. Soviet military tactics is defined as
the theoretical and practical aspects of preparation for
the conduct of combat by subunits, units, and formations
of the various services of the Armed Forces, the combat
arms, and the combat service support troops. It is
subdivided into general tactics and the respective tactics
of the Armed Forces. . . . [Ref. 35: p. 3]
As in the U.S., each service's tactics can be further
reduced to branch tactics within a particular service (i.e.
fighter tactics and bomber tactics within the Air Forces)
[Ref. 26: p. 75], Like all other elements of military
affairs, tactics consists of two aspects: the practical and
the theoretical. In this context, the theoretical aspect is
reflected in textbooks, manuals, and regulations. The
practical aspect is simply the application of theory, the
activities of commanders, decisionmaking, and combat itself.
[Ref. 35: p. 4]
Tactics is also considered the most dynamic
principle of military art, changing constantly with the
acceleration of technical progress. For this reason, combat
readiness, morale, and training are considered the deciding
factors in victory. The quality of troops must keep up with
the changes in weaponry if they are to remain effective.
This section has provided a basic understanding of
Soviet military thought in the context of its marked
difference from American military thought. Military
doctrine and its subordinate components have undergone
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important transformations in content since the Bolshevik
regime took power, and especially since the end of World War
II. Again, the Scotts give excellent coverage to these
topics. Theoretically, however, the concepts of Soviet
military thought have remained the same in form and scope
since Frunze's establishment of the "Unified Military
Doctr ine. n
With the fundamentals of military thought in mind,
Soviet and U.S. concepts of war may be presented. In this
section it will become apparent that the U.S. and USSR have
quite different views on warfare. Americans find it
difficult to understand the Soviet hierarchical structure of
military thought and the concept of "immutable " laws of
warfare. Likewise, the Soviets are puzzled by American
attitudes. They see no structure, let alone truth, in the
"mysticism" of U.S. concepts. Because of the overabundance
of public information flowing from the U.S. (much of which
is contradictory), the USSR often has difficulty in
determining what is doctrine and what is debate.
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VI. SOVIET VERSUS U.S. CONCEPTS OF WAR
As we know, Soviet military doctrine has a defensive
orientation. We do not need war. The Soviet Union and
its armed forces have no intention of attacking anyone.
But were aggression against us to become fact, the Soviet
armed forces would respond to the need for conducting
decisive actions until the total defeat of the aggressor.
Marxist-Leninist Teaching on
War and the Army
Such statements riddle Soviet military literature and
denote a prevalent attitude concerning the defensive nature
of their armed forces. Their primary military objective is
professed to be "defense of the homeland." This contradicts
the American perception of a "Soviet threat" (which the
Soviets frequently denounce as completely unfounded) and the
expansionist nature of the USSR. Consequently, this
statement (like so many others) seems only to be false
propaganda in an attempt to legitimize the Communist regime.
On the other hand, this statement would support the
beliefs of those who tend to "mirror -image" American values
in analyzing Soviet intentions. One could substitute the
"United States" for the "Soviet Union" in this quote because
Americans also consider themselves defensive. They do not
need war and have no intention of attacking anyone unless it
were in response to aggression. The fundamental belief in
such value-projection is that neither nation wants to
destroy the world through all-out nuclear war, that
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"mutually assured destruction" (MAD) is a deterrent in
itself. Herein lies the continued problem of "threat
perception." Nowhere is such misperception more prevalent
and proper evaluation of the enemy more important than in
evaluations of Soviet and American thoughts on war.
The ideological, cultural, and institutional factors
discussed to this point have a tremendous influence on both
U.S. and Soviet attitudes towards war. The experiences of
war have historically been external to U.S. pursuits but
internal to Soviet/Russian existence. Consequently, there
is a tendency to trivialize Soviet intent while ignoring
important rhetoric of dangerous consequence. Likewise, the
Soviet Union "maximizes the danger and exaggerates the
hostility." [Ref. 24: p. 38] The resulting misperceptions
make it difficult for the
Soviets to believe that imperialism does not reciprocate
their institutionalized hate, and for Americans to
understand that the violence with which Soviet leaders
speak may be objectively translated into military doctrine
and hardware. [Ref. 24: p. 38]
In order to avoid such misunderstandings, the U.S.
officer must review several factors. First, it will be
necessary to understand Soviet attitudes towards the
nature, types, and laws of war as embodied in the teachings
of "Marxist-Leninist Theory on War and the Army." This will
be followed by a review of American warfighting attitudes
and the differences between U.S. and Soviet definitions of
"peaceful coexistence" and "detente," as well as the current
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policies of glasnost and per estr o yk a. It would be
impossible to evaluate Soviet actions properly without a
well-founded knowledge of these concepts, as value-
projection is avoidable only through such an understanding.
A. MARXIST-LENINIST THEORY ON WAR AND THE ARMY
This field of study is considered a component of
dialectical materialism and that element of the ideology
which addresses the nature, development, and content of war.
It is, more importantly, an
ideological weapon for unmasking the reactionary military
ideology of imperialism, for the struggle against various
bourgeois theories which justify wars and distort their
political and class nature and origin in the interests of
the exploiting classes. [Ref. 46: p. 39]
The "theory on war and the army" provides the foundation
for developing military science and formulating military
doctrine. This supports the superiority of doctrine's
political principles because war was defined by Lenin (who
borrowed from Clausewitz) as the "continuation of politics
of classes and states by violent means." In this respect,
the essence of war has two hierarchical elements: politics
and armed conflict. Politics determines the nature and
character of a war, and armed conflict begins when
"aggressive policies engender a military conflict . . . when
other political forces are unable to prevent such a
conflict." [Ref. 52: p. 24]
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1 . Causes and Types of War
According to the ideology, the causes of war lie in
the economic foundations of antagonistic societies. The
primary antagonists are of course the imperialists, led by
the United States. The imperialist socio-economic system is
considered to have the following irreconcilable conflicts:
competition among the monopolies and the world's
leading imperialist centers, • periodically repeated
economic, energy, currency and financial crises, and the
intensification of conflicts between labor and capital,
between industrially developed capitalist states and the
developing nations. [Ref. 53]
These conflicts resolve themselves in a political struggle
between classes. Imperialistic policies further compress
them into the socio-economic system and, consequently,
generate war and armed conflict [Ref. 53] . This scenario
emphasizes the Soviet perception of war's economic
foundations and will be even more relevant when the types of
war are reviewed because these antagonistic conflicts
produce "unjust" wars.
Because of war's antagonistic essence, the Soviets
believe that it is alien to the nature of Socialism and
cannot occur between two Socialist states. As such, they
recognize only four types of war: war between states of
opposite social systems, wars of national liberation, civil
wars, and wars between imperialist states
[Ref. 26: pp. 66-77] . These types of war are then separated
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into two categories of "just" (progressive) and "unjust"
(reactionary)
.
Just wars are those which defend the proletariat
against aggression or reactionary forces and thus "promote
historical development." [Ref. 46: p. 42] The Soviets list
the following as just wars:
* Wars in defense of Socialist countries against
imperialist aggressors.
* Proletarian civil wars against the bourgeoisie.
* National liberation wars of colonial peoples, dependent,
and developing countries against imperialism.
* Wars of liberation waged by peoples of bourgeois
countries who have become the victims of imperialist
invaders and who are fighting for their state
sovereignty. [Ref. 46: p. 42]
Of these, any war which consolidates and develops Socialism
and Communism is considered the most just. Through these
distinctions one can already recognize a contradiction with
the opening epigraph on page 75. While the Soviets profess
not to need war or to have any intention of starting one,
they are fully justified in doing so if it will guide
history towards the realization of Communism. The political
nature of war allows the Soviets to actually initiate the
armed conflict if other political means (i.e. peaceful
coexistence) have failed. This is a prime example of the
Marxist-Leninist ideology being able to address a subject in
any necessary context.
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Unjust wars are those which support the politics of
imperialism. They represent the U.S. goal (as perceived by
the Soviets) to achieve world domination. Specifically,
unjust wars include:
* Counter-revolutionary wars waged by the bourgeoisie
against the proletarian revolutionary movement.
* Aggressive wars of imperialist states against Socialist
countries.
* Imperialist wars for the restoration of the colonial
system.
* Imperialist wars of conquest against peaceful bourgeois
countries.
* Wars between imperialist states aimed at achieving a
redistribution of spheres of influence and world
domination. [Ref. 46: pp. 47-48]
From these perspectives the Soviet involvement in
Afghanistan is seen as completely just because the regime in
Kabul is considered progressive and Soviet troops are simply
carrying out their international duties. In fact, Marshal
Grechko modified doctrine in 1974 to reflect this more
"internationalist" role by announcing that the mission of
the Soviet Armed Forces was no longer exclusively "defense
of the homeland." This doctrinal change suggested (and
subsequently substantiated through action) that the USSR
would more strongly defend its interests abroad.
[Ref. 26: p. 68] Any U.S. military involvement around the
world is, however, perceived as unjust because it supports
the politics of imperialism.
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The Soviets also define wars by their scale. They
recognize the possibility of both local and world war, with
the realization that the former could escalate into the
latter. Furthermore, either conventional or nuclear weapons
could be used, and the possibility of escalation from
conventional to nuclear "is not ruled out." However, they
reject the notion of "limited nuclear war," stating that
there can be no institutional mechanism for controlling the
use of nuclear weapons. In fact, they contend that "any
attempt to employ nuclear weapons will lead to all-out,
universal nuclear war." [Ref. 53]
The Soviets state that the U.S. and NATO have built
up their armed forces in the pursuit of world domination and
preparation for launching such a war. They justify their
own military build-up and the maintenance of parity with the
West (if not superiority) as a means of "restraining the
imperialist 'hawks'" through "fear of retaliation."
[Ref. 53] This restraint translates into "deterrence" from
a U.S. perspective and suggests that the Soviet Union might
consider the fear of MAD a deterrent in itself. At this
point the conscious avoidance of value-projection becomes
crucial because the Soviets do not in fact consider MAD a
credible deterrent option. It is irrelevant to their
nuclear warfighting strategy, which is based upon surviving
a U.S. first strike and simultaneously launching a crushing
retaliatory strike. In this respect, war is still an
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extension of politics and deterrence is a means, not an end
[Ref. 26: p. 98].
It is from this perspective that the Soviets respond
to the question of the irrationality of using nuclear
weapons, the idea that they "break the link between politics
and war." The answer is that such a view is unscientific
and a result of the "idealization" of these weapons. The
Soviets explain that changes in technology do not change the
political essence of war. [Ref. 14: p. 3 5] A review of the
actual "laws of war" and "laws of armed conflict" will
provide a better understanding of Soviet views on war
because they believe that conformity to these laws will
bring success to the "just" warfighter.
2. The Laws of War and Armed Conflict
The Soviets contend that war, like all else in the
world, is governed by scientific laws which can only be
understood through Marxism-Leninism. A knowledge of these
laws is considered
an essential prerequisite of successfully solving the
fundamental problems of defending socialism, strengthening
the defense capability of the nation and the combat might
of the armed forces and achieving victory in a war.
[Ref. 54]
These laws are included in the development of
military policy, expressed in military doctrine, and serve
as the basis of military science. The Soviets believe that
war would be left to coincidental circumstances and chance
without such laws. Although the laws of war are considered
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universal, the Soviets contend that the unscientific nature
of U.S. military thought limits its ability to understand
and apply them. Furthermore, they are not steadfast
doctrine in the USSR, but debatable and still being
discovered or interpreted. [Ref. 55: p. 49] The laws
presented here are taken from a textbook written in 1982
which is used in higher military schools [Ref. 54] .
The first group of laws is entitled the "general
laws of war" and encompasses war as a whole. This group
includes:
* The laws governing the dependence of war, its scale and
fierceness upon the policy and political goals of the
[warring] sides.
* The laws governing the outbreak of wars from the nature
of antagonistic socio-economic formations and from the
aggressive policy inherent to exploiting classes.
* The laws determining the dependence of the overall
method of waging the war upon the method of production
[scientific potential] .
* The laws reflecting the dependence of the course and
outcome of a war upon the balance of the economic,
scientific-technical, moral-political and particularly
the military potentials of the belligerent forces
(classes, states, coalitions). [Ref. 54]
These laws include some of the principles and
characteristics of war already discussed. The first law
presents the political essence of war, while the second
concerns its economic foundations. Interestingly, the scope
of these seemingly rhetorical laws is often greater than
might be imagined. For example, the Soviets include the
production and advance stockpile of reserve weapons,
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equipment, foodstuffs, and raw materials in the economic
equation of the second law [Ref. 55: p. 50]. In short,
these laws define war, its origins, its methods, and the
factors affecting its outcome. An understanding of their
tenets affords the U.S. officer not only a more accurate
perception of his Soviet counterparts but an opportunity to
exploit Soviet weaknesses and his own strengths during
either peacetime or war [Ref. 55: p. 50],
The next group of laws includes more specific
principles and is entitled the "general laws of armed
conflict." This group is not particularly different from
the first, but important in that it makes a distinction
between "war" and "armed conflict." One must remember that
armed conflict is a subordinate element of war which begins
after political methods have failed in attaining one's
objectives. In this regard, war exists without armed
conflict. In essence, these laws "disclose armed conflict as
a single bilateral process" and are "examined predominantly
within military science, and are a subject of the general
theory of military art." [Ref. 54] They are as follows:
* The law of the dependence of the course and outcome of
the armed struggle on the relationship of forces (combat
might) of the belligerent sides.
* The law of the interrelationship of military actions, of
their correspondence to political and military goals.
* The law of the unity [effective command and control] of
military actions.
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* The law of uneveness of the distribution [decisive
concentration] of men and equipment. [Ref. 55: p. 51]
Although the semantics of these definitions are somewhat
vague, this group is obviously subordinate to the "general
laws of war" and reemphasizes armed conflict's dependence
on political, economic, and technological factors.
The third group of laws is the "particular laws of
armed conflict" and is implemented at various levels of
armed combat (battles, army and front-level operations) and
operations (offensive, defensive) and accounts for the
nature of the involved forces (an army, partisans, and civil
defense) and area of combat (air, sea, ocean, land) [Ref.
54]. These laws are studied at the level of strategy,
operational art, and tactics. Although not generally
published in available military literature, they are
identifiable through careful research [Ref. 55: p. 51].
Again, they are subject to debate and differences, depending
upon the source.
This presentation of Soviet concepts of war provides
the U.S. officer with several useful insights in evaluating
the Soviet from his own perspective. First, a knowledge of
the laws of war and armed conflict can be applied not only
to an encounter with the enemy, but to peacetime training
and education through more effective wargaming with a
realistic Soviet force. Second, English language
translations of Soviet literature are initially difficult to
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understand due to contextual and even grammatical
differences between English and Russian. Hopefully, the
quotes and excerpts presented here have enabled the reader
to better "decipher" the often cryptic Soviet rhetoric and
extract the important elements without dismissing it as
propaganda. Later in this chapter the subject of
translations will be addressed even further. Third, the
concepts presented here will assist the reader in analyzing
U.S. views of war and their contrast with the Soviet laws.
Finally, the dangers of value-projection should be more
obvious with this understanding. The importance of avoiding
the "mirror -image " cannot be overstated.
Yet the mirror image has endured in various forms in the
West for decades. It is simpler and far less painful to
ascribe to an opponent's intentions or strategies that are
congenial, rather than to expend the effort to study him.
We should not reject Soviet concepts because they fail to
reflect ours. The challenge presents itself clearly:
every effort expended to study our adversary acts as a
hedge against serious error in time of war.
[Ref. 14: p. 36]
B. THE LANGUAGES OF WAR
U.S. attitudes towards war differ greatly from those of
the Soviet Union. The concepts to be presented here will
reinforce the seriousness of understanding these differences
and avoiding value-projection. This section will first
present an American perspective on war and related
tendencies in dealing with the Soviet threat. This will be
followed by a presentation of Soviet and U.S. views of
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peaceful coexistence, detente, glasnost, and perestroyka.
These concepts are central to evaluating either society's
perception of war. It must be reemphasized that the goal
here is not to decide which perspective provides a better
formula for victory, but to approach the enemy from his own
perspective and to use the resulting knowledge when
evaluating his actions.
1 . An American Perspective
American scenarios stop with the nuclear explosions. In
that sense, our war plans end where the Soviet war plans
begin. Although there will be armies in the field, the
military operation is assumed to have stopped where the
imagination did.
The last Soviet battle does not take place when the
missiles have ceased to fly, but when the revolutionary
executions against the wall have stopped.
[Ref. 24: pp. 43, 31]
These differences in Soviet and American perceptions
of nuclear war have their origins in the early years after
World War II. The Soviet Union's technological inferiority
forced it to rely on the human factor and, consequently, the
psychological warfare of manipulation, deceit, and surprise.
The United States, on the other hand, was able to
concentrate its superior forces on capabilities while
downplaying the role of troops. The result of this U.S.
emphasis was the development of an "abstractness of war" by
the early 1970s. The progress made in the policy of detente
was allowing the U.S. to relax its armed forces.
[Ref. 24: pp. 37-39]
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In 1972, at the U.S. Naval War College (NWC) in
Newport, Rhode Island, this abstractness and relaxation had
profound effects on the school's curricula. That year the
NWC eliminated all courses on the Soviet Union, as well as
any discussion of intentions (Soviet or U.S.). Capabilities
of U.S. forces were discussed, but not those of other
nations. This apparently made it difficult to teach modern
strategy and tactics, as the USSR was the only comparable
naval adversary. These changes went so far as to ignore
Russian battles when studying the eighteenth-century history
of land warfare! [Ref. 24] Although the result was an
extreme non-re cognition of the enemy,
the language did reflect the American mood ... at least
for that time and place. The U.S. concept was that war
could be made moral by translating it through its
historical evolution, into some universal laws that would
apply to all weapons and all nations. What was being
proposed was a reduction of the idea of military violence
to the study of its use in police-like action.
[Ref. 24: p. 34]
This internal elimination of the enemy is not
surprising when U.S. historical experiences of war are
considered. As mentioned in Chapter I, adequate threat
perception is difficult in an predominantly isolationist
society. The institutional non-recognition of a Soviet
This account was given by Robert Bathurst in "The Two
Languages of War." [Ref. 24] Bathurst is a retired Navy
Captain who served as an instructor at the NWC in 19 72. He
also served a tour as Assistant Naval Attache in Moscow
(1965-67) .
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threat in the 1970s simply reflected the American views of
detente and peaceful coexistence. However, given the Soviet
definitions and applications of these concepts, such an
outlook was potentially disastrous.
2. Detente and Peaceful Coexistence
Detente emerged in 1969 as a replacement for the
Cold War. The Nixon/Kissinger detente strategy included:
* Acknowledgment of the "superpower" status of the USSR.
* A willingness to legitimize the division of Europe.
* A variety of agreements with the USSR to further mutual
cooperation and make economic/technical assistance
available.
* Development of a new set of norms (status quo) and rules
for competition between the two superpowers.
[Ref. 56: pp. 134-36]
In the United States, detente was considered not only a
"relaxation of tensions" (its literal meaning translated
from French) , but a step towards friendship as well.
Unfortunately, the American definition of detente failed to
recognize the Soviet view. While the Russian language
equivalent to detente, razryadka , also translates into
"relaxation of tensions," it has no implication of
friendship, cooperation, change of policy, or agreement
[Ref. 7: p. 9]. In fact, detente allowed the USSR to
continue its high level of international involvement and its
journey towards inevitable Communist victory. The following
statement by Leonid Brezhnev best describes the Soviet
perception of detente:
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Detente does not in the slightest abolish, and it cannot
abolish or alter the laws of class struggle. . . . We make
no secret of the fact that we see detente as a path
leading to the creation of more favorable conditions for
peaceful socialist and communist construction. [Ref. 57]
Furthermore, the Soviet concept of detente is
considered only in the broader context of "peaceful
coexistence." In the United States, peaceful coexistence
assumes that the two superpowers will be able to occupy the
globe together, indefinitely, without conflict. The Soviets
do not embrace such an attractive attitude. They consider
coexistence another form of conflict between the two
ideologies until Capitalism is defeated. This defeat (like
the conflict) need not be military in nature. Because of
the political and economic bases of war and society, the
fall of Capitalist economies and governments is the
prerequisite for Communist victory. This ideological war
will include armed conflict only if political methods fail.
The following Soviet statements should be adequate in
providing the reader with a Soviet perspective of peaceful
coexistence. These attitudes bring our discussion back to
the initial Marxist-Leninist principle of constant struggle
until the final "synthesis. "
Peaceful coexistence between socialist and capitalist
states, between these two systems is not a class peace but
a specific form of class struggle, one which has the
objective of excluding war from the arsenal of the
resources of foreign policy. In the condition of peaceful
coexistence, socialism and capitalism are waging an acute
struggle which does not escalate into war. [Ref. 58]
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The Marxist-Leninist Parties hold that the policy of
peaceful coexistence of governments with different social
regimes does not lead (and cannot lead) to ideological
peace between the two systems, and, on the whole, class
opposed forces. On the contrary, it objectively imparts
to the most ideological struggle with imperialism an even
sharper nature, demanding increased violence with respect
to enemy intrigues, and the timely exposure of its
ideological diversions. [Ref. 59]
With this understanding, it becomes necessary to
address those current Soviet policies which have great
potential for similar Western misinterpretation. Although
they are not frequently addressed in a military context,
their intended effect on military affairs is becoming
understood with time.
3. Glasnost and Perestroyka
While the strength and outcome of these policies are
yet to be realized, they already have important implications
in Soviet society. They are primarily domestic policies not
widely discussed in a military context and are not directly
related to Soviet concepts of war. Nevertheless, their
importance in this forum lies in their potential for
misunderstanding in the West. The respective translations
of glasnost and perestroyka into openness and restructuring
serve as the roots of such a misunderstanding.
Therefore, this discussion will use the terms glasnost
and perestroyka when referring to the policies as they exist
in the USSR, and will use openness and restructuring only
when referring to their American interpretations.
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When glasnost is defined as openness in the U.S.
press an image is projected of a society which is moving
closer to American ideals of freedom as expressed in the
U.S. Constitution . This is understandable because glasnost
is often discussed in terms of demokraticheskii tsentralizm
[democratic centralism]. This concept is, in fact, included
in Article 3 of the Constitution of the USSR [Ref. 60], In
a Soviet context, democracy actually supports the
dictatorial powers. Lenin has been quoted as explaining
socialist democracy as follows:
Soviet socialist democracy is not the least
incompatible with individual rule and dictatorship.
What is necessary is individual rule, the recognition of
the dictatorial powers of one man. . . . All phrases about
equal rights are nonsense. [Ref. 61: p. 2]
From this perspective glasnost does not mean a move
towards Western democracy, and the reforms implemented under
glasnost are not meant to change the structure of Soviet
society. General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev has reaffirmed
that the principles of Party rule "remain unshakeable.
"
[Ref. 61: p. 3] Glasnost's effects thus far seem to be only
a loosening of controls on the Soviet citizen in such areas
as public expression, private enterprise, and local
elections, to name a few. There are, however, limits to
this loosening, and glasnost does not permit freedoms to the
extent of those afforded Americans in the Bill of Rights .
The changes which are being made are not ends in themselves,
but means towards an end which promotes the forces of
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Communism. Like peaceful coexistence and detente, glasnost
does not offer to exchange the pursuit of Communism for
Western democratic ideals and the elimination of conflict
with Capitalism.
Similarly, perestroyka should not be confused with
the restructuring of Soviet society. It is more accurately
a method for raising the consciousness and discipline of the
society, and of encouraging a subsequent (and wiser) sense
of initiative [Ref. 62], Obviously, perestroyka has
important implications for the military, as it actually
reinforces the discipline of the collective rather than
restructuring the military establishment. An example of
perestroyka in several Soviet airborne assault units is
provided in the following passage:
they began restructuring [perestroyka] ... to
radically improve military discipline by developing the
communists' aggressiveness, animation, vigor, and sense of
principle. Everything was done so that every communist
would work more intensely, and there was a sharp turn from
mobilizing people toward strictly organizing the
performance of tasks to strengthen order and discipline in
all lines, and mainly on the personal level ... In party
influence on people, preference was given to preventing
violations and to individual work directly in the
companies, batteries, and platoons, where military skills
are forged. [Ref. 63]
This review of Soviet concepts should make obvious
the differences between Russian language terms and their
English translations. The U.S. officer must understand that
translations are themselves only perceptions and can assume
the cultural biases of the society in which they are used.
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This makes the task of understanding the Soviet perspective
more difficult because accurate translations depend upon the
proficiency of the translator, who must be trained not only
in language skills but in the culture of the target nation
and in the subject being translated [Ref. 64] . Obviously,
every translation of Soviet military literature cannot be
performed by an expert translator. Therefore, the U.S.
analyst of the Soviet military must be aware not only his
own biases but of the translator's possible mistakes as
well. Hopefully this presentation has provided the reader
with a better understanding of the Soviet perspective and an
awareness of those biases to be avoided in threat analysis.
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VII. CONCLUSION
The swift development of new technology and the
resulting application of new hardware and modes of thought
for its employment make threat analysis a never ending task.
This thesis has addressed only a portion of Soviet military
thought with a presentation of its foundation in Soviet and
Russian ideology, influences, and thoughts on military
affairs and war. Because of the seemingly endless volumes
of Soviet military literature and the level of attention
which studies of military affairs receive in the USSR, there
is always one more topic to address or discuss more
thoroughly and one more insight to be made. In fact, a
review of the Soviet Armed Forces structure has
intentionally been left out of this study because the scope
of such a presentation would be immense, and excellent
coverage of that structure is available in other sources,
primarily T he Armed Forces of the USSR [Ref. 26]. The
concepts which have been reviewed here will aid the reader
in understanding the differences between the Soviet and U.S.
Armed Forces structures.
What must be remembered is that each nation has
developed a military establishment which reflects its
particular needs for security. These needs are determined
by the ideological, cultural, and institutional values and
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influences of the respective societies. As these differ,
so do the armed forces which emerge. The following Soviet
passage recognizes this fact very well.
First of all the army is a state organization: It is
maintained by the state, and it is an organ of the latter.
It is created by the latter "in its own image and
likeness." Whatever the state is in terms of its
classlessness and content, so is the army that defends its
interests. [Ref. 65]
This passage further addresses the "inseparable tie between
the army and the people" by stating that the stronger these
ties, the "higher are the moral and fighting qualities of
the [military] personnel." It also mentions that such
strength is not possible in an "imperialist army" and uses
Vietnam as an example where U.S. troops consequently lost
morale in the face of increasing opposition. The importance
of these statements lies not in the allegations made against
the U.S. forces but again in recognizing the differences
between the Soviet and American perspectives. Each state
has indeed developed a military "in its own image and
likeness": the United States emphasizing individualism, and
the Soviet Union— a collective. These differences are
similar to those noted in the comparison of oaths in Chapter
III.
In this regard, the five primary Soviet Armed Services:
the Strategic Rocket Forces, Ground Forces, Air Defense
Forces, Air Forces, and the Navy are integrated under a
combined arms concept of one military strategy. As presented
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earlier, an individual service can contribute to the
achievement of strategic goals, but cannot singularly
determine the course and outcome of war.
While there is a tendency to relate the Soviet concept
of combined arms to U.S. (or NATO) Joint Forces, such
comparisons are fundamentally flawed because of the
differences in scope. For example, there are sixteen Soviet
Military Districts which have operational command over the
Ground Forces, Air Defense Forces, and frontal aviation.
While this might be considered a Joint Command in the West,
the Soviet District commander has force-levels at his
disposal which would not be possible in the NATO structure.
In fact, the Military Districts are structured to become
fronts in wartime. [Ref. 26: pp. 188-90]
An additional field which could be afforded more
attention is that of how to analyze Soviet military
literature so as not to become the victim of disinformation.
This subject is addressed by William F. Scott in Soviet
Sources of Military Doctrine and Strategy . Although this
work was published 12 years ago, it remains an invaluable
source for "deciphering" the content and authority of almost
every Soviet Military periodical, as well as several books.
Scott analyzes those periodicals and books which have
served as indoctrination tools for Soviet military personnel
through contributions to the development doctrine and
strategy. In this analysis he addresses the differences
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between the open content of American military literature and
comparable Soviet literature.
Interestingly enough, the Soviets encounter a greater
problem in studying U.S. military affairs than do their
American counterparts in studying Soviet military affairs.
Imagine the difficulty a Soviet analyst might have in
filtering through the sea of public information emanating
from the United States. While the U.S. analyst must learn
to filter declaratory propaganda and disinformation from
actual doctrine, the Soviet analyst must decide between what
is doctrine, debate, and simply opinion. Furthermore, he
must decide for himself how authoritative each American
military spokesman is. This is much more difficult than the
"Kremlinologist's" task because debate is more prevalent in
the U.S. military structure. Policy may be disagreed with
to a greater extent than in the USSR. Soviet analysts may
be puzzled when subordinates publicly disagree with a
senior's decision. While debate is used in Soviet military
literature as a forum for policy development, it ceases when
the final decision is made. The Soviets occasionally make
reference to their belief that the mass of seemingly
contradictory information flowing from the U.S. is indeed a
method of deception [Ref. 17] . This represents the existence
of Soviet mir r or -ima ging because deception and
disinformation are accepted methods in Soviet military
thought.
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This introduction to the Soviet perspective should, at
the very least, make the reader conscious of the dangers of
mirror -imaging and the necessity for assuming a different
perspective. Such a conscious effort is the beginning of
proper threat perception, which can subsequently be applied
as an element of threat analysis. While hardware and weapon
parameters are the primary element of this equation, means
of employment at every level from doctrinal to tactical are
decided upon by a commander who receives his perspective
from the ideological, cultural, and institutional influences
discussed here.
There is no better method of knowing the enemy than to
study him. As mentioned before, this education must begin
early and be constant throughout a career. Education need
not (and cannot) always be formal, but simply a part of
every officer's self-generated professional development. At
a very minimum, the Soviet Military Thought series,
translated and published by the U.S. Air Force, should be a
part of every command's library. The series' declared
purpose is, after all, "the exchange and stimulation of
ideas." Much insight can be gained from simply reading
The Officer's Handboo k (number 13 in the series) . The
"General Reference Data" included in Chapter 12 of that
publication is in itself quite interesting. In addition to
pertinent information found in similar U.S. handbooks, the
Soviets include items such as almanac data for 177 different
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nations, the solar system, the worlds oceans, seas, and
straits; as well as the fundamentals of physics, geometry,
and electricity. While this point may seem trivial, and
different views may be taken as to why such data is included
for the Soviet officer's knowledge, it is important because
it serves as a portion (however insignificant) of the
Soviet perspective.
A fitting conclusion is simply to encourage an
introduction. The books and articles used in research for
this thesis were purposely chosen from open sources
available to anyone with access to an adequate library or
academic bookstore (with the exception of a few unpublished
papers). This was done in the hope that the reader might
take advantage of additional research. Such study is the key
to evaluating the enemy properly. In this regard, the List
of References and Bibliography serve as invaluable sources
to the cumulative knowledge of both Western and Soviet
analysts and theorists on Soviet military affairs.
Hopefully this thesis has served as such an introduction to
"Understanding the Soviet Threat."
100
APPENDIX: MILITARY INDOCTRINATION AND SERVICE
The following overview of Soviet military indoctrination
and service is taken from Reference 66 and is intended to
provide a concise review of the Soviet citizens unique
experiences in pre-draft schooling and active service.
1. At age 6, formal education begins; eleven years of
schooling required.
2. At age 7 , children are encouraged to join youth
groups. Groups include Little Octobrists (ages 7-9),
Young Pioneers (10-14/15), and Komsomol, the All-
Union Communist Union of Youth (14-28).
3. At age 15, Soviet teenagers begin military training
and receive a minimum of 140 hours before induction.
Boys get thirty additional hours during summer camp.
First aid is emphasized for girls.
4. By age 17, all males must register for military
service. They may be assigned to specific training
prior to induction.
5. Soviet law provides for conscription of women, but in
practice this is not done. However, women may
volunteer. A very few women are commissioned
officers.
6. Few deferments from military service are granted; the
majority of these allow selected students to attend
approved schools to learn skills critically needed by
the state or military. Males enroll concurrently in
Reserve Officer Training (ROT). In rare instances,
males may be deferred for health or family reasons
and excused from their active commitment upon
reaching age 27.
7. At age 18, most Soviet males are inducted for
enlisted service. Call-ups are held semi-annually in
the Spring and Fall. Conscripts rarely have a choice
of service or branch. The usual term of service is
two years for the Army and Navy ashore and three
years for the Navy afloat.
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8. Males who qualify by competitive examination and
political recommendation may attend one of about 140
higher military schools. These schools are the
primary sources of active duty officers.
9. The Soviet military does not have an "up-or-out"
policy for officers, but does impose maximum ages on
active service according to rank. An officer who
reaches his maximum age but is not eligible for
retirement will be transferred to the reserves.
10. The Soviet armed services require a large number of
reserve officers. Citizens receiving reserve
commissions may spend their entire careers as part-
time reservists, or they may be called to a period of
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